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Abstract: For centuries, the defense of this nation has
focused on the protection of its physical infrastructure. Now,
in the Digital age, this nation must also focus on the
protection of its cyber infrastructure. Attacks on both the
private and public sectors are constant and costly. The
federal government has tasked the Department of Homeland
Security with the protection of the nation's cybersecurity.
However, the young Department has struggled to define
itself as a leader in this industry. This article explores the
formation of the Department and its well-chronicled
leadership, management, and credibility woes.
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I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
"Our enemies are innovative and resourceful, and so are we. They
never stop thinking about new ways to harm our country and our
people, and neither do we.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sit down, close your eyes, take a deep breath, and then imagine.
Imagine the lights in this room suddenly go out, and we
lose all power. We try to use our cell phones, but the
lines of communication are dead. We try to access the
Internet with our battery-powered laptops, but the
Internet, too, is down. After a while, we venture out
into the streets to investigate if this power outage is
affecting more than just our building, and the power is
indeed out as far as the eye can see. A passer-by tells
us the banks are closed and the ATMs aren't working.
The streets are jammed because the traffic lights are
out, and people are trying to leave their workplaces en
masse. Day turns to night, but the power hasn't
returned. Radio and TV stations aren't broadcasting.
The telephone and Internet still aren't working, so
there's no way to check in with loved ones. After a
long, restless night, morning comes, but we still don't
have power or communication. People are beginning
to panic, and local law enforcement can't restore order.
As another day turns to night, looting starts, and the
traffic jams get worse. Word begins to spread that the
US has been attacked- not by a conventional weapon,
but by a cyber weapon. As a result, our national power
grid, telecommunications, and financial systems have
been disrupted- worse yet, they won't be back in a few
hours or days, but in months. The airports and train
stations have closed. Food production has ceased. The
water supply is rapidly deteriorating. Banks are closed
so people's life savings are out of reach and worthless.
The only things of value now are gasoline, food and
'George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, Remarks by the President at
the Signing of H.R. 4613, the Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Aug. 5,
2004).
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water, and firewood traded on the black market. We've
gone from being a superpower to a third-world nation
practically overnight.2
There was a time when people believed that the Atlantic Ocean to
the East and the Pacific Ocean to the West protected the United States
from a physical attack. Pearl Harbor, and more recently, September
11, 2001, changed that perspective. The 9/11 terrorist attacks forced
the United States to re-evaluate its physical security. While "the
emphasis has clearly been on physical infrastructure rather than
cybersecurity," the Digital Age arrived and "cyberspace is where the
bad guys are going."3 Any re-evaluation of national security must
necessarily focus on the Nation's cyber infrastructure. Geographic
isolation no longer provides any protection, because "[i]n cyberspace
national boundaries have little meaning. Information flows
continuously and seamlessly across political, ethnic, and religious
divides ... 4
II. THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY IS BORN
The vast interconnectedness of cyberspace provides nearly instant
access to incredible amounts of information. That access to
information changed the course of ordinary business, the availability
of an education, and the way people interact. This interconnectedness
is not without significant risks as the "vulnerabilities that exist are
open to the world and available to anyone, anywhere, with sufficient
capability to exploit them."5
'Addressing the Nation's Cyber Security Challenges: Reducing Vulnerabilities Requires
Strategic Investment and Immediate Action: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Emerging
Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology of the H. Comm. on Homeland
Security, noth Cong. (2007) (statement of 0. Sami Saydjari, President, Professionals for
Cyber Defense, and Chief Executive Officer, Cyber Defense Agency, LLC) [hereinafter
Reducing Vulnerabilities], available at
http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/200704251453o7-825o3.pdf.
3 Jon Swartz, Terrorists' use ofInternet spreads, USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2005-02-2o-cyber-terror-
usatx.htm.
4 THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE 7 (2003),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National-Cyberspace-Strategy.pdf.
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"Given the ever evolving nature of cyberthreats, complacency is
not an option."6 After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
federal government responded, in part, by melding twenty-two
existing federal organizations and agencies into one new department-
the Department of Homeland Security ("the Department").7 The
government had not attempted a "transformation of this magnitude"
since the 1940s when the government created the Department of
Defense. 8 By consolidating the responsibilities of these twenty-two
component agencies, this "ambitious undertaking" labored to improve
the nation's preparedness.9 Because "[c]ritical infrastructure is by
definition essential for the survival of the nation [and] [n]etworked
computer systems form the nerve center of the country's critical
infrastructure," the government's preparedness efforts also includes
efforts to secure the nation's cyber infrastructure. The Department
describes its "overriding and urgent mission" as securing the
American homeland and protecting the American people.10
In the years following its inspired inception, the Department has
faltered. "Contracting abuses, poor leadership, and low employee
moral" have plagued the Department.1 Regarding the Department's
programs, personnel, and resources, government reports continuously
document the Department's "[i]nadequate staffing, insufficient
6 Daniel Pullman, GAO Again Slams Agencies' Cybersecurity Efforts, GOV'T EXECUTIVE,
July 19, 2005 (statement of Representative Tom Davis, R-VA, Chairman of the H. Comm.
on Oversight and Government Reform),
www.govexec.com/story-page.cfm?articleid=31778.
7 H. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., CRITICAL LEADERSHIP VACANCIES IMPEDE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 1 (2007) [hereinafter CRITICAL LEADERSHIP
VACANCIES], http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070709112923-81o91.pdf.
8 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 1 (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do4945t.pdf.
9 CRITICAL LEADERSHIP VACANCIES, supra note 7.
lo DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURING OUR HOMELAND 2 (2004),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/DHSStratPlanFINAL-spread.pdf. The
Department's strategic goals and objectives are directly linked to accomplishing the three
objectives of the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security: (i) prevent terrorist
attacks from occurring within the United States, (2) reduce America's vulnerability to
terrorism; and (3) minimize the damage of such attacks and improve the recovery process
from those attacks that do occur.
1 Pullman, supra note 6.
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training, and ineffective monitoring." 12 These weaknesses are
particularly conspicuous in the context of the Department's efforts to
secure the nation's cyber infrastructure. For instance, the Department
initially failed to properly accord the nation's cyber infrastructure the
attention and resources required for its protection. To some extent,
the Department self-corrected, and eventually, after a fourteen-month
delay, named an Assistant Secretary of Cybersecurity.13 Nevertheless,
the Department suffered a massive exodus of key cybersecurity
officials.14 Furthermore, the palpable tension between Congress and
the Department undermines the government's ability to protect the
nation's cyber infrastructure. Because such protection requires "swift
and ongoing decision making, often based on gut-feeling, rather than
on what the text book dictates,"15 the fundamental question is can the
Department get the job done?
Every minute of every hour of every day, the nation's cyber
infrastructure is under attack. The increases in the frequency and the
complexity of cyber attacks are alarming.16 Such cyber attacks range
from relatively minor acts including cyber vandalism and theft of
intellectual property, to more serious crimes such as extortion,
industrial espionage, and the stoppage of production and services.17
12 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PURCHASE CARDS: CONTROL WEAKNESSES LEAVE DHS
HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO FRAUDULENT, IMPROPER, AND ABUSIVE ACTIVITY 11 (2oo6),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do617.pdf.
13 Declan McCullagh, Homeland Security fills top cybersecurity post, CNET NEWS,
Sept.18, 2oo6, http://news.cnet.com/Homeland-Security-fills-top-cybersecurity-
poSt/2100-7348_3-6116975.html.
14 Eric Lipton, Former Anti-Terror Officials Find Industry Pays Better, NEW YORK TIMES,
June 18, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2oo6/o6/18/washington/181obby.html.
15 KFIR DAMARI, AMI CHAYUN & GADI EVRON, CASE STUDY: A CYBER-TERRORISM ATTACK,
ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE (20o6), http://www.beyondsecurity.com/besirt/advisories/team-
evil-incident.pdf.
16 Larry Greenemeier, China's Cyber Attacks Signal New Battlefield Is Online, SCIENTIFIC
AMER., Sept. 18, 2007, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=1A9C21oF-E7F2-
99DF-3C85F17B168o98oD&sc=h1oo322.
17 Major Cyberspace Vulnerabilities Will Be Used Against Us: Hearing Before H.
Subcomm. on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the
Census of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, lo8th Cong. (2003)
(statement of Richard Clark, Special Advisor, United States National Security Council)
[hereinafter Major Cyberspace Vulnerabilities], available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/clarke-8apro3.pdf.
2009]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") described cyber terrorism
as a "criminal act perpetrated by the use of computers and
telecommunications capabilities, resulting in violence, destruction
and/or disruption of services, where the intended purpose is to create
fear by causing confusion and uncertainty within a given population,
with the goal of influencing a government or population to conform to
a particular political, social or ideological agenda." 18 Because the
United States is specifically "vulnerable to a strategically crippling
cyber attack from nation-state-class adversaries.., the government
must provide for the common defense of this new territory."'19
As current Assistant Secretary of Cybersecurity and
Communications Greg Garcia explained, "300 million Americans
count on us every day for uncompromised continuity of operations of
our most critical systems, such as financial services, transportation,
government and emergency services, online commerce, health care,
manufacturing, and process control systems like water purification
and electric power plants."20 In short, America can no longer afford to
turn a blind eye to the dangers lurking in cyberspace. Experts agree
that it is "unreasonable to think that even the nation's most secure
critical networks are impervious to attacks," and that it is absolutely
crucial for the U.S. to have networks that can provide "essential
services in a timely manner despite an attack, accident, or failure."21
Securing the nation's cyber infrastructure must be an indispensable
national priority. Hence, in conjuction with other important goals, the
federal government created the Department of Homeland Security.
On November 25, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law
the legislation that created the Department of Homeland Security.
The Homeland Security Act charged the Department with three
is Virtual Threat, Real Terror: Cyberterrorism in the 21st Century: Hearing Before the S.
Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, io8th Cong. (2004) (statement of Keith Lourdeau, Deputy Assistant Director,
Cyber Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/printtestimony.cfn?id= 1o54&wit-id=2995.
19 Reducing Vulnerabilities, supra note 2.
20 Gregory Garcia, Remarks at the Third Annual Government Forum of Incident Response
and Security Teams Conference (June 26, 2007), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/gc_18296oolooo6.shtm.
21 Press Release, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Internet Security
Experts Urge U.S. to Secure its Critical Computer Networks (June 8, 2007), available at
http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2oo7/o6o8cybersec.shtml (statement of Howard
Lipson).
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primary strategic objectives.22 To accomplish these objectives, the bill
organized the Department into four different directorates, which
included (1) Border and Transportation Security, (2) Emergency
Preparedness and Response, (3) Science and Technology, and (4)
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.23
The development of this new executive department was an
ambitious undertaking. "Not since the creation of the Department of
Defense in 1947 has the federal government undertaken a
transformation of this magnitude. Each of the 22 agencies and
organizations brought their own management challenges, distinct
missions, unique information technology infrastructures and
systems."24 The twenty-two new components of the Department
included Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), the
Transportation Security Administration ("TSA"), the Federal
Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA"), the Nuclear Incident
Response Team, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, the Federal
Computer Incident Response Center, the Secret Service, and the Coast
Guard .25 While, on January 1, 2003, the Department technically
became a functional part of the federal government, the Department
did not assume the responsibilities of most of its assimilated twenty-
two agencies and organizations until March 2003.
A. THE DEPARTMENT ENTERS THE CYBER SECURITY SCENE
Among its numerous responsibilities, the Department of
Homeland Security is also the nation's top cybersecurity watchdog.
After the Department's creation, President Bush eliminated the
position of Senior Advisor to the President on Cybersecurity.
Consequently, federal law and policy delegated to the Department
thirteen key cybersecurity-related responsibilities.26 These thirteen
responsibilities obligate the Department to:
22 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 (2002).
23 Department of Homeland Security, History: Who Became Part of the Department?
[hereinafter DHS History], http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_o133.shtm.
24 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION SECURITY: HOMELAND SECURITY NEEDS
TO ENHANCE EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS PROGRAM 3 (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do71oo3t.pdf.
25 DHS History, supra note 23.
26 Zoe Lofgren, Perspective: Thumb Twiddling on Cybersecurity, CNET NEWS, Oct. 10,
2004, http://www.news.com/2oo-7348_3-542oo59.html.
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1. develop a national plan to provide protection for the
nation's critical infrastructure, including its cyber
infrastructure,
2. develop partnerships with other federal agencies, state
and local governments, and the private sector,
3. improve the process by which the government and the
private sector share information regarding cyber
attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities,
4. develop the process by which the government issues
warnings regarding cyber threats and attacks,
5. coordinate the government's response and recovery
planning efforts following a cyber attack,
6. identify and evaluate cyber threats and vulnerabilities,
7. support efforts to reduce cyber threats and
vulnerabilities,
8. promote research and development efforts to
strengthen the nation's cyber infrastructure,
9. promote awareness regarding cybersecurity issues,
1O. foster cybersecurity training and certification,
11. enhance the cybersecurity of federal, state, and local
governments,
12. strengthen international cyberspace security, and
13. integrate cybersecurity with national security.27
27 Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Addressing Cybersecurity, Hearing
Before the S. Subcomm. on Federal Financial Management, Government Information,
Federal Services, and International Security of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, logth Cong. (2005) (statement of David A. Powner, Director,
Information Technology Management Issues), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do5827t.pdf.
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In June 2003, the Department established the National Cyber
Security Division ("NCSD") to serve as the national focal point for
addressing cybersecurity-related issues and coordinating the
implementation of the government's cybersecurity efforts.28  Four
separate branches as well as a public/private cybersecurity
partnership program comprise the NCSD. This collaboration
facilitates partnerships between the Department and other interested
industrial, governmental, and academic parties.29 The organizational
chart for NCSD is provided below.
NCSD/US-CERT Strategic plan
•Milestones
* Progress report
•Policy
* International
•Privacy
* Human resources
* Budget/contracts
* Office management
DHS Cyber Security • Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
Partnership Proigram m
Foster effective public/private
partnership among and between
industry, government, and academia
iII I
US-ERTLawEnfrceent Outreach and Strategic
Operations and Intelligence Awareness Initiatives
* Situational wareness Intelligence requirements Communications/ Messaging CIP cyber security
* Analytical cell • Law enforcement coordination Coordination Control systems security
* Federal coordination National Cyber Response Stakeholder outreach Software assurance
* Production Coordination Group and engagement * Training and education
* Continuity of operations plan * Exercise planning and coordination
Standards and best practices
Research and development coordination
Each of the four NCSD branches has several responsibilities. The
US-CERT Operations Branch "focuses on situational awareness,
analytical cells, and federal coordination." To this end, the operations
branch coordinates all cyber incidents warnings and responses across
both the government and the private sector .... ) "30 US-CERT is
always operational.31 The Law Enforcement and Intelligence Branch
28 U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION:
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FACES CHALLENGES IN FULFILLING CYBERSECURITY
RESPONSIBILITIES 2 (2005) [hereinafter CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION], available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO5434.pdf.
29 Id. at 24.
30 Id. at 25.
31 Id. at 26.
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manages the National Cyber Response Coordinating Group and
facilitates the coordination of NCSD's cyber-related law enforcement
and intelligence activities.32 The Outreach and Awareness Branch
strives to promote cybersecurity awareness,aa and works to develop
collaborative cybersecurity partnerships between public and private
entities.34 Lastly, the Strategic Initiatives Branch is organized into six
different teams with each team maintaining different functional
responsibilities. The responsibilities of this branch include (i)
developing a critical infrastructure protection plan for the Information
Technology ("IT") Sector,35 (2) promoting the development of an
adequate number of effective cybersecurity professionals, (3)
enhancing the cybersecurity capability of the government's work
force,36 and (4) improving the nation's ability to respond to cyber
incidents.37
B. THE NATION'S REVOLVING DOOR OF CYBERSECURITY LEADERSHIP
A series of high profile resignations underscores the nation's
cybersecurity leadership woes. Before the Department became
functional in January 2003, Richard Clarke held the nation's top
cybersecurity position as Chairman of the President's Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board ("CIPB"). 38 As the momentum
behind the Department's formation increased, Clarke jockeyed for the
position of Deputy Secretary under the Department's first Secretary,
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 27.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 27-28.
38 Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Ellen McCarthy, Top U.S. Cyber-Security Official Resigns,
WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64915-
2004Octl.html. On October 19, 2001, President George W. Bush announced that he had
designated Richard Clarke as Chair of the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection
Board. At the time of this appointment, Clarke also served as the Special Advisor to the
President for Cyber Space Security.
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Tom Ridge.39 Clarke allegedly vocalized that he would not accept any
position other than that of the Deputy Secretary. 40 But, after
President Bush did not select Clarke as Deputy Secretary of the
Department, a White House spokesperson noted that a slighted Clarke
boycotted the National Security Council meetings then chaired by
Condoleezza Rice.41 Finally, on January 30, 2003, Clarke resigned as
Chairman.42
Following Clarke's resignation, Howard A. Schmidt, who had
previously served as Vice-Chairmain of the CIPB, became the front-
runner for the nation's top cybersecurity advisor.43 After the February
2003 release of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, however,
39 Interview by Larry King with Richard Clarke, former White House advisor (Mar. 24,
2004), transcript available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/o4o3/24/lkl.oo.html. During the interview,
Condoleezza Rice, then-National Security Advisor stated:
In fact, when he came to me and asked if I would support him with Tom Ridge to
become the deputy secretary of homeland security, a department which he now
says should never have been- never have been created. When he asked me to
support him in that job, he said he supported the president. So frankly, I'm
flabbergasted.
Interview by Tim Russert with Richard Clarke, former White House counterterrorism
official (Mar. 28, 2004), transcript available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/46o8698.
Moderator Tim Russert stated:
One article captured it this way: 'Mr. Clarke ... who had sought the No. 2 spot at
Homeland Security, was passed over for the post in October 2002 and demoted
by Secretary Tom Ridge and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice to the
position of special adviser for cyberspace security.'
40 Barton Gellman, Anti-Terror Pioneer Turns In the Badge, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2003,
at A21, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A17694-2003Marl2.
41 J. Michael Waller, Clarke's Colleagues Say He's Lost Credibility, WORLD NET DAILY,
Mar. 30, 2004, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=37790.
42 Associated Press, U.S. Cybersecurity Czar to Resign, WIRED, Jan. 28, 2003,
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2oo3/o1/57454.
43 Dan Verton, Howard Schmidt Leaving Government Cybersecurity Job,
COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 21, 2003,
http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/o,io8ol,80549,oo.html.
On January 28, 2002, Schmidt, assumed his role as Vice-Chairman of the Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board. See Dan Verton, Former Microsoft Exec Begins Federal
Critical Infrastructure Protection Job, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 28, 2002,
http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/o,1o8ol,67754,oo.html.
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the President dissolved the CIPB and shifted to the Department the
responsibilities of securing the nation's cyber infrastructure." Just
three months after Clarke's resignation-possibly sensing that his role
in the nation's cybersecurity leadership was tenuous-Schmidt
resigned. 45 In an April 21, 2003 resignation e-mail, Schmidt
explained:
[w]hile significant progress has been made, there still is
much to do. It is the role of industry to take the lead in
the implementation of the strategy and the creation of
the mosaic of security. To accomplish this will require
real-time solutions, not just reports and plans that take
years to implement [and] have limited value in dealing
with the tremendous vulnerabilities that exist here and
now. Each sector, each enterprise, each company and
each user must do their part to secure their piece of
cyberspace.46
The resignations of Clarke and Schmidt left the government
without a cybersecurity point person. As one industry official
lamented, "[c]urrently, no one's in charge. You have no effective
advocate whose only job is to focus on cybersecurity."47 Consequently,
the responsibility of overseeing the nation's cybersecurity fell onto the
shoulders of the Department's Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure
Protection, then Robert Liscouski. 48 As Assistant Secretary,
Liscouski's responsibilities were already expansive and included the
4William Jackson, Howard Schmidt is Leaving the White House, GOVT COMPUTER NEWS,
Apr. 21, 2003, http://www.gcn.com/online/vollnol/21815-1.html.
45 Margaret Kane, White House Security Adviser Resigns, CNET NEWS, Apr. 22, 2003,
http://www.news.com/White-House-security-adviser-resigns/2100-1009-3-99784o.html.
On October 19, 2001, President George W. Bush announced that he had designated
Richard Clarke as Chair of the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. At the
time of this appointment, Clarke also served as the Special Advisor to the President for
Cyber Space Security.
46 Verton, supra note 43; see also Jackson, supra note 44 (noting that Schmidt reportedly
sought a position as adviser to the Secretary Ridge).
47 Caron Carlson, Departures Cast Doubt on IT Security at DHS, EWEEK, Apr. 28, 2003,
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Departures-Cast-Doubt-on-IT-Security-at-DHS.
48 Id.
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protection of both the nation's physical and virtual infrastructures.49
Consequently, critics complained that neither the White House nor
the Department had a high-ranking official whose duties were
exclusively dedicated to protecting the nation's cybersecurity.so
C. THE DEPARTMENT FINALLY ADDRESSES
CYBERSECURITY LEADERSHIP
Later that year, the Department attempted to address the void in
its cybersecurity leadership. On September 15, 2003, Secretary Ridge
announced the appointment of Amit Yoran as the Director of NCSD.51
Yoran's appointment pleased the Business Software Alliance ("BSA").
Robert Holleyman, BSA's President and Chief Executive Officer,
explained that "Mr. Yoran has worked extensively in the public and
private sectors to prevent and respond to information security
breaches. He knows first hand the vast threats that exist today and
what needs to be done to quickly identify, assess, and mitigate those
threats."52
During testimony at a Congressional hearing, titled Virtual
Threat, Real Terror: Cyberterrorism in the 21st Century, Yoran
explained that NCSD serves as the focal point for "[e]nhancing the
Nation's cyber readiness and response, analyzing cyber threats and
vulnerabilities, disseminating threat warning information through
alerts and warnings, [and] coordinating incident response." 53
49 Id.
50 Jackson, supra note 44.
51 Press Release, Tom Ridge, Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge Announces
Director of the National Cyber Security Division (Sept. 15, 2003), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press-release_0242.shtm. According to the Press
Release, Yoran served as the Vice President for Managed Security Services at Symantee
Corporation. Prior to his move to the private sector, Yoran was the Director of the
Vulnerability Assessment Program within the Computer Emergency Response Team at the
Department of Defense, and the Network Security Manager at the Department of Defense.
In this position, Yoran was responsible for maintaining operations of the Pentagon's
network.
52 Amit Yoran Named Head of Cyber Security Division, TECH LAW JouRNAL DAILY E-MAIL
ALERT, Sept 12, 2003, http://www.techlawjournal.com/alert/2oo3/o9/16.asp.
53 Virtual Threat, Real Terror: Cyberterrorism in the 21st Century: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech., and Homeland Security of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
1o8th Cong. (2004) (statement of Amit Yoran, Director, National Cyber Security Division
Department of Homeland Security), available at
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According to Yoran, NCSD's top priorities were "to prevent a cyber
attack from occurring and to limit its scope and impact on the critical
infrastructures . . ."54 He continued, "[o]ur government has a
fundamental duty to warn the public of imminent threats and to
provide protective measures, or at least the information necessary for
the public to protect their systems."55 NCSD's initial attempt to
provide to the public valuable cyber security information appeared
successful. On January 28, 2003, the day that NCSD inaugurated the
US-CERT web site, the US-CERT web site recorded more than one
million hits.56 Within days of its launch, more than 250,000 direct
subscribers received national cyber alerts.57
Despite the appearance of progress, Yoran's position was still
several levels removed from the Department's Secretary. At the time
of Yoran's appointment, the Director of the NCSD reported to the
Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection of the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (then Robert
Liscouski). The Assistant Secretary then reported to the Under
Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.
Finally, the Under Secretary reported to the Secretary of Homeland
Security.58
In September 2004, just one year after his appointment, Yoran
resigned from the nation's top cybersecurity position. 59 Yoran's
abrupt departure prompted widespread speculation in the
cybersecurity community. Although Yoran denied it, many in the
industry believed that the Department disappointed Yoran by not
providing him with enough authority to attack the nation's
cybersecurity problems.6° Consequently, "[t]here was a sense it was
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?renderforprint=18dd=1054&wit-id=2
998.
s4 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Amit Yoran Named Head of Cyber Security Division, supra note 52.
59 O'Harrow Jr. & McCarthy, supra note 38.
60 Id. Regarding Yoran's departure, one industry source concluded that "[h]e's an
entrepreneur who wanted to get things moving, and I think he finally got to the point
where he realized he could be more effective working outside the government." Dan
Verton, Nation's Cybersecurity Chief Abruptly Quits DHS Post, COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 1,
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essentially a powerless position.'61 In an interview following his
departure, Yoran maintained that he "never applied for an assistant
secretary position," and that he "never advocated for one."6 2 Yoran
explained that he resigned because "[t]he startup work was complete,
so to speak. I helped craft a series of programs and initiatives, and
recruited talented engineering expertise, so I decided it was time to
move on."'63 Because the Department "made some tangible and
tactical operational achievements, including establishing the US-
CERT," Yoran felt comfortable leaving the Department at that time. 64
"We've mapped the government's entire IT space and made progress
on control system security. So my departure wasn't quite as abrupt as
some reports have indicated."65
Nevertheless, some considered Yoran's resignation another
setback for national cyber security. Paul Kurtz, Executive Director of
the Cyber Security Industry Alliance ("CSIA"), noted that Yoran's
departure was "symptomatic of the frustration all around," and as a
result of this resignation, "[c]yber-security has fallen down on that
totem pole." 66 He continued, "The bottom line is that without an
individual at a senior level in charge of cybersecurity at the DHS, the
2004,
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleld
=96369&pageNumber=l.
61 O'Harrow Jr. & McCarthy, supra note 38. Goodall noted that as Yoran "was trying to
elevate his priorities in the DHS, he had to do battle with the marketplace and the politics
of the issue. I can empathize with the difficulty of trying to do that." See Verton, supra
note 43.
62 Robert Lemos, U.S. Cybersecurity Chief Resigns, CNET NEWS, Oct. 1, 2004,
http://www.news.com/U.S.-cybersecurity-chief-resigns/2100-7348-3-53925o1.html.
63 Todd Datz, Amit Yoran on Why He Left DHS, CSO MAG., Apr. 1, 2005,
http://www.csoonline.com/article/22o223/AmitYoran-on-Why-HeLeftDHS?page=i
64 Id.
65 Verton, supra note 43. Following his departure, Yoran described his biggest frustration
regarding the Department as:
Perhaps a lack of effectiveness in much of the government's security practices, a
lack of practicality. There's a phenomenal amount of paperwork around
certification and accreditation. There's a significantly sized industry around
Washington, D.C., running paperwork exercises on cybersecurity, as opposed to
investing in improved operations and implementing security technologies.
66 O'Harrow Jr. & McCarthy, supra note 38.
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vision, priorities and programs are not coming together."67 Douglas J.
Goodall, Chief Executive of RedSiren, also saw Yoran's departure as a
significant loss: "The fear that I would have is that [the] momentum
he was building would go away. Now we start all over again. And the
government's attention span is fleeting."68 Similarly, cyber security
specialist Kevin Poulsen explained that Yoran's resignation was
merely a symptom of the more virulent condition. Simply stated, "[i]n
an age of physical terrorism and real-world threat, [the Department
is] not giving cyber-security much attention."69 Then, just three
months after Yoran's resignation as Director of the NSCD, Assistant
Secretary for Infrastructure Protection Robert Liscouski also
resigned.7o
D. THE DEPARTMENT'S BIG ANNOUNCEMENT
Finally, on July 13, 2005, Homeland Security Secretary Michael
Chertoff announced the Department's new six-point agenda. 71
"[D]esigned to ensure that the Department's policies, operations, and
structures are aligned in the best way to address the potential
threats-both present and future-that face our nation,"72 the six-
point agenda included several organizational initiatives. According to
Secretary Chertoff, the "Department must drive improvement with a
sense of urgency. Our enemy constantly changes and adapts, so we as
a Department must be nimble and decisive."73 The agenda renamed
67 Jaikumar Vijayan, Lack of Leadership Hampers Cybersecurity Efforts, Says Critics,
COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 18, 2006,
http://www.computerworld.com/ation/article.do?command=viewArticeBasic&articleld
=112820&intsrc=articlemoreside.
68 Verton, supra note 43.
69 O'Harrow Jr. & McCarthy, supra note 38.
70 Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Statement by the Department of
Homeland Security on Assistant Secretary Bob Liscouski's Resignation (Jan. 11, 2005),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press-release_0593.shtm.
71 Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Secretary Michael
Chertoff Announces Six-Point Agenda for Department of Homeland Security (July 13,
2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press-release-o7o3.shtm.
72 Id.
73 Id.
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the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate as
the Directorate for Preparedness, and by doing so, the agenda
consolidated preparedness assets from across the Department's
various components. 74 Managed by an Undersecretary, this new
Directorate also formed another new position- the Assistant Secretary
for Cyber Security and Telecommunications.75 The agenda charged
the new Assistant Secretary with "identifying and assessing the
vulnerability of critical telecommunications infrastructure and assets;
providing timely, actionable and valuable threat information; and
leading the national response to cyber and telecommunications
threats."76
Many praised Chertoffs announcement. As Symantec's
government relations manager, Tiffany Jones said, "[t]he
establishment of an assistant secretary for cybersecurity and
telecommunications will be a tremendous asset for developing a
coordinated, national approach needed to address the myriad of
information security challenges that individuals and enterprises face
today."77 The Cyber Security Industry Alliance ("CSIA"), which had
already asked for coordination and guidance from the Department,
"commend[ed] Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") for their decision to create
an Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications."78
But, CSIA President Kurtz cautioned that the creation of the new
Assistant Secretary position was not a cure-all, but "certainly a
significant first step in raising the level of importance of cyber security
nationally. It creates the foundation needed to move forward with the
execution of a comprehensive approach to cyber security that builds
on public and private sector efforts to date."79
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Anne Broache, Feds Create New Post of Cybersecurity Czar, ZDNET, July 13, 2005,
available at http://news.zdnet.com/21oo-1oo9-5787o86.html. The Assistant Secretary
for Cyber Security and Telecommunications: Renewed Leadership from DHS, ExEcUTIVE
DIRECTOR'S MESSAGE (Cyber Security Industry Alliance, Arlington, Va), July/August 2005
[hereinafter Renewed Leadership from DHS], available at
https://www.csialliance.org/news/newsletters/july2005/julyexecdir.html.
78 Renewed Leadership from DHS, supra note 77.
79 Id.
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E. THE WAITING GAME
Despite the wave of excitement following Secretary Chertoffs
announcement, the lengthy delay in actually appointing the Assistant
Secretary curbed the industry's support for the Department's
initiatives. The execution of this "significant first step" required much
more time than the industry expected, prompting CSIA's Executive
Director Kurtz to conclude that the absence of an assistant secretary
was "not a simple personnel issue. It is indicative of the ongoing lack
of attention being paid to cybersecurity at the most senior levels of
government."'s Kurtz's sentiment was clear: "The bottom line is that
without an individual at a senior level in charge of cybersecurity at the
DHS, the vision, priorities and programs are not coming together."8'
Congressional irritation over the absence of an Assistant Secretary
also mounted. Representative John Dingall (D-MI) concluded that
"[t]his noticeable and lengthy absence of cybersecurity leadership
conveys a lack of appreciation for our [niation's real and mounting
cyber threats." 82 Nearly eleven months after the Secretary's
announcement, in a June 9, 2006 letter to Secretary Chertoff,
Representatives Bennie Thompson (D-MS) and Lofgren noted that the
House Committee on Homeland Security3 had "repeatedly inquired
with the Department how it plans to protect vital national cyber
interests and how it can do so without steady leadership."8 4 The letter
80 Press Release, Cyber Security Industry Alliance, CSIA Renews Call for Stronger Cyber
Security Leadership from the Department of Homeland Security (July 12, 2006).
81Vijayan, supra note 67.
82 Id. (quoting Congressman John Dingell (D-MI)).
83 In 2002, the U.S. House of Representatives created the Committee on Homeland
Security. Initially, the Committee acted as a select, non-permanent Committee, and
provided Congressional oversight over the development of the Department of Homeland
Security. On January 4, 2005, the first day of the ioth Congress, the House designated
the Committed as a Standing Committee, thereby making it a permanent committee. See,
e.g., Dep't of Homeland Sec., About the Committee: Homeland Security Committee
Overview, http://homeland.house.gov/about/index.asp (also noting that the Committee
exercises subpoena power).
84 Letter from Bennie G. Thompson, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Homeland Security,
and Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member, H. Subcomm. on Intelligence, Information Sharing,
and Terrorism Risk Assessment, to Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland
Security (June 9, 2oo6), available at
http://hsc.house.gov/press/index.asp?ID=6o&SubSection=o&ssue=4&DocumentType=o
&PublishDate=2oo6&issue= 4.
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continued, "As you know, the Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security
Division ("NCSD") is still led by an 'Acting Director."85 In closing, the
Committee asked the Secretary to provide it with answers to several
cybersecurity-related questions including "[w]hen will the
Department finally name the Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security,
which you agreed to create last summer as part of your 'Second Stage
Review?"86
Clearly frustrated, Representative Thompson asked, "How long
will the nation have to wait? I, for one, hope Mr. Chertoff doesn't wait
until a cyber attack causes billions of dollars in damages or results in
lost lives before he decides to appoint an assistant secretary to take
charge of our nation's cyber crisis."87 On the one-year anniversary of
Secretary Chertoffs announcement of the Assistant Secretary
position, Representative Thompson publicly criticized the
Department.
[I]t's apparent that the Department is moving at dial-
up speed in hardening this infrastructure to respond to
cyber attacks. It is hard to take the Department's
promises seriously, when, one year later, they still
haven't appointed a qualified individual to fill the
position of Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and
Telecommunications and have outsourced critical
cyber positions within the Department. It boggles the
mind that this Administration has not had a top-level
cyberczar leading our nation's efforts since 2003.88
Lofgren continued to express her disappointment: "At the time [of the
announcement], I applauded Chertoff for recognizing the necessity of
this position to better protect our nation's cyberinfrastructure from
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Grant Gross, Cybersecurity Group Knocks U.S. Government Efforts, COMPUTERWORLD,
Dec. 13, 2005,
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId
=10704o&intsrc=articlemorebot.
88Press Release, H. Comm. on Homeland Security, Failure to Appoint Leader Leaves Weak
Links in Global Cybersecurity Efforts (July 13, 20o6), available at
http://hsc.house.gov/press/index.asp?ID=74&SubSection= i&Issue=4&DocumentType=o
&PublishDate=2oo6&issue=4.
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attacks by hackers, criminals and terrorists."8 9 But, the prolonged
vacancy of the position forced Lofgren to "take back my applause
[because] our cyberinfrastructure continues to be at risk."90 She
continued, "On the one-year anniversary of Chertoffs announcement,
I am extremely disappointed but unfortunately not surprised that
Homeland Security has yet to begin such a critical task .... Filling the
position of assistant secretary for cybersecurity is the beginning, not
the end, of protecting our nation's cyberinfrastructure."91
Two months later, the United States General Accountability Office
("GAO") joined the choir of discontent. In September 2006, the GAO
released a report titled DHS Leadership Needed to Enhance
Cybersecurity.92 The GAO report characterized the limited progress
on a variety of Department initiatives and explained that the
"relationships among these initiatives were not evident." 93
Consequently, the report noted that the Department was not
"adequately prepared to effectively coordinate public/private plans for
recovering from a major Internet disruption."94 The GAO report
concluded that the Department has "many challenges to overcome,
several of which will be difficult without effective leadership ....
Addressing this leadership void starts with DHS naming its Assistant
Secretary of Cyber Security and Telecommunications."95
F. THE DEPARTMENT'S BIG ANNOUNCEMENT (ROUND 2)
Finally, the Department acted. On September 18, 2006, more than
fourteen months since the Department first established the position,
Secretary Chertoff announced the appointment of Greg Garcia as
89 Zoe Lofgren, Rescinding my Applause for Chertoff, CNET NEWS, July 14, 2006,
http://www.news.com/rescinding-my-applause-for-ChertOff/2010-1028_3-6o93654.html.
go Id.
91 Id.
92 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECION: DHS
LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO ENHANCE CYBERSECURITY 1 (2006),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do61o87t.pdf.
93 Id. at 9.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 17.
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Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications. 96
According to Secretary Chertoff, Garcia possessed the right mix of
"experience in government and the private sector to continue to
strengthen our robust partnerships that are essential to this field. He
has the expertise to focus resources and activities within the cyber and
telecommunications communities in a manner that is consistent with
our risk-based approach to homeland security."97 Shannon Kellogg,
director of government and industry affairs at RSA, the security
division of the EMC Corporation, seemed pleased with Garcia's
appointment. "He's a solid choice and will do a good job." 98 But
Kellogg cautioned, "At the same time, it's important for him not to go
in there and try to boil the ocean. He needs to choose three or four
key priorities on cyber and work to move those forward."99
Once the Department had an Assistant Secretary of Cybersecurity
in place, the pressure to perform was enormous. Garcia received
mixed reviews after he took the helm as Assistant Secretary. When
asked about Garcia's performance to date, former NCSD director Amit
Yoran answered, "There is so much that is on Assistant Secretary
Garcia's plate that is critical, and the ability to respond [to cyber
attacks] is so difficult to measure." 1°° Yoran believes that Garcia has
succeeded in expanding the awareness of cyber threats and the need
for better security. "Is progress being made? I would say yes. Is it
sufficient? That's harder to say... there's certainly a lot more that still
needs to be done."1° 1 According to Yoran, "Garcia is doing certain
96 Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Statement by Homeland Security Secretary
Michael Chertoff on the Appointment of the Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security
Telecommunications (Sept. 18, 20o6), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr 15875975615o.shtm.
97 Id.
98 Brian Krebs, Top Cyber-Security Post Is Filled, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2oo6,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2oo6/o9/18/AR2oo6o918oo928.html.
99 Id.
100 Brian Robinson, Gregory Garcia: His First Year as Cybersecurity Czar, FED.
COMPUTER WK., Nov. 12, 2007, http://www.fcw.com/print/13-4o/features/15o748-
i.html.
101 Id.
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things very well, but there's still a lot that isn't fully understood. I
can't say whether overall he's doing an A or a C level job."102
Others in the industry are more optimistic. Jim Lewis, the director
the Center for Strategic and International Studies' technology and
public policy program, stated that "[t]here's no doubt [Garcia's] won
the beauty contest vote, and most people seem to think he's done a
good job. But, [it is] too early to rate how the DHS overall is doing on
cybersecurity." 103 Shannon Kellogg '04 commended Garcia for his
pragmatic approach, and noted that Garcia did not attempt to "boil
the ocean, but rather, Garcia identified three or four priorities and
continued to stress those priorities."105 Garcia's priorities included an
effort to bring into harmony the Department's various components,
and to improve the process for sharing information between the
government and industry.1°6 Others believe that Garcia's success is
attributable, in part, to his credibility in the industry. Liesyl Franz,
Vice-President of Information Security Programs and Policy at the
Information Technology Association of America, believes that Garcia's
background strengthened his credibility. Franz noted:
Industry called for the [assistant secretary] position
and also called for the person appointed to be from the
private sector, because there is a big role that the
private sector needs to play in incidence response. With
regard to that, Garcia and his staff have been
exemplary in building coordination between the
various parties.1°7
Nevertheless, what appeared to be a successful first year for Garcia
as the Assistant Secretary did not alleviate Congressional concerns
regarding the Department's cyber security leadership and leadership
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Kellogg was the Director of Information Security Policy, Office of Government Relations
at EMC Corporation.
105 Robinson, supra note loo.
1o6 Id.
107 Id.
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in general. In July 2007, Representative Thompson described the
effects of the ongoing leadership crisis.
[W]hat's worse than a Homeland Security organization
with poor leadership is a homeland security
organization with no leadership. Not just a national
security concern, DHS's lack of leadership has
triggered record-low employee morale, an
immeasurable disservice to the hundreds of thousands
of men and women working on the front lines to
protect our country.108
Thompson's tirade referenced a July 2006 survey released by the
Office of Personnel Management ("OPM"). The OPM conducted a
survey of thirty-six federal offices and agencies,109 and the survey
demonstrated that the Department ranked last or near to last in every
category. 110 For example, the Department ranked last in job
satisfaction 111 and results-oriented performance, and next to last on
leadership.112
1o Press Release, Vacancy Report Finds Homeland Security and Continuity of Government
at Risk (July 9, 2007), available at
http://hsc.house.gov/press/index.asp?ID=237&SubSection=o&Issue=o&DocumentType=
o&PublishDate=o.
109 See Stephen Losey, DHS Leaders Aim to Turn Around Poor Morale, FED. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2007, http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=3o47128.
110 Homeland Security Employees Rank Last in Job Satisfaction Survey, ABC NEWS,
Feb. 8,2007, http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=nationworlddd=5o17688; see
also http://www.fhcs.opm.gov/2oo6FILES/FHCS-2oo6_AgencyReportPart5.pdf. On
February 8, 2007, the President made his first visit in three-and-a-half years to the
Homeland Security headquarters, a place that internal employees describe as the worst
place in the federal government to work.
11 For example, the survey noted that only 579/ of Department employees reported
satisfaction with their jobs. This figure was about lo% less than the government wide job
satisfaction rate of 67.5%. See Losey, supra note o9.
12 Homeland Security Employees Rank Last in Job Satisfaction Survey, supra note 11o;
see also
http://www.fhcs2oo6.opm.gov/Published/FHCS-2oo6_AgencyReportPart5.pdf.
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III. WHO OR WHAT JEOPARDIZE AMERICAN CYBER SECURITY?
According to Richard Clarke, the former Chair of the President's
Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, the threat to cyberspace is
"really very easy to understand. If there are major vulnerabilities in
the digital networks that make our country run, then someday,
somebody will exploit them in a major way doing great damage to the
economy." 113 Clarke explained that the exploitation of such
vulnerabilities will likely be devastating. "Transportation systems
could grind to a halt. Electric power and natural gas systems could
malfunction. Manufacturing could freeze. 911 emergency call centers
could jam. Stock, bond, futures, and banking transactions could be
jumbled... our forces [will be] at great risk by having their logistics
system fail."114 The potential for panic among the American people is
real, and it is frightening. Accordingly, this article explores the
persistent threats to the nation's cyber security and the Department's
efforts to combat those threats, and concludes that the current
organizational infrastructure of the Department is ill-conceived and
ill-equipped to secure the nation's cyber infrastructure.
A. ONE MAN'S CRUSADE AGAINST TITAN RAIN
In September 2003, security analyst Shawn Carpenter, an
employee at Sandia National Laboratories ("Sandia"),115 helped to
investigate a network break-in at Lockheed Martin.116 A few months
later, Sandia's systems experienced a similar attack. 117 After
consulting with a counterpart in the Army's cyber intelligence unit,
Carpenter identified a relationship between what appeared to be two
independent cyber attacks.118 That realization prompted Carpenter to
113 Major Cyberspace Vulnerabilities, supra note 17.
114 Id.
115 Sandia National Laboratories, About, http://www.sandia.gov/about/index.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2009).
116 Nathan Thornburgh, The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies (And the Man Who Tried
to Stop Them), TIME, Aug. 29, 2005,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/o,9171,1o989o6,oo.html.
117 Id.
118 Thornburgh, supra note 116.
342 [Vol. 5:2
MCFADYEN
initiate an unofficial investigation of these attacks. Since the Army
had experienced several similar attacks, Carpenter told his Sandia
superiors that he intended to share with the Army any findings that
the investigation might yield. 119
For the better portion of the next year, Carpenter continued his
investigation. In March 2004, Carpenter-who the FBI later dubbed
'Spiderman'-first discovered the activities of these cyber hackers.120
Carpenter had pursued a group of suspected Chinese cyber hackers as
the group deftly navigated the cyber world. The cyber hackers
executed an unrelenting series of coordinated attacks that are now
collectively referred to as TITAN RAIN. 12' As promised, Carpenter
shared his findings with several unofficial Army contacts. 122 By
October 2004, Carpenter's Army contacts had introduced Carpenter
to the FBI, and the FBI learned the nature of Carpenter's
investigation.123 Carpenter claimed that, for the next five months, he
served as a confidential informant for the FBI. 2 4 Carpenter's work
soon reached the most senior levels of the FBI's counterintelligence
division, where the FBI allegedly incorporated Carpenter's work into
an existing task force.125
As Carpenter explored the activities of TITAN RAIN, he noted that
the cyber hackers worked very, very quickly and with a definite sense
of purpose.12 6 The sophistication of the attacks and the attackers
captivated Carpenter. "Most hackers, if they actually get into a
government network, get excited and make mistakes. Not these guys.
They never hit a wrong key."127 According to Carpenter, the hackers
would commandeer hidden sections of hard drives, consolidate as
many files as possible, and immediately transmit the files to work
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Thornburgh, supra note 116.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
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stations in South Korea, Hong Kong, or Taiwan. 128 From these
locations, the cyber hackers sent the files to mainland China. 129
Carpenter pursued these cyber hackers until the trail ended in the
southern Chinese province of Guandong.130 The TITAN RAIN attacks
emanated from just three Chinese routers. 131 When Carpenter
uncovered the TITAN RAIN routers, he carefully installed into the
primary router's software a homemade bugging code.132 Carpenter
designed the bugging code to send an e-mail alert to an anonymous
Yahoo! e-mail account each time the cyber hackers made a move on
the Internet.133 Within two weeks the software delivered over 23,000
messages to Carpenter's anonymous e-mail account.134
Carpenter's work led to some startling discoveries. In late May
2004, Carpenter uncovered a cache of stolen documents that the cyber
hackers had stored in zombie servers in South Korea.135 In addition to
American military information, Carpenter uncovered hundreds of
documents concerning the detailed schematics of propulsion systems,
solar paneling, and fuel tanks for the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter.136
Carpenter also copied an enormous collection of files that the cyber
hackers had stolen from Redstone Arsenal, which is home to the Army
Aviation and Missile Command. 137 These files included the
specifications for aviation mission planning systems for Army
helicopters.138
As Carpenter shared with the FBI the information that he had
gathered, the agents assigned to Carpenter assured him that the work
128 Thornburgh, supra note 116.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Thornburgh, supra note 116.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Thornburgh, supra note 116.
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was justified. 139 When the FBI asked Carpenter to stop the
investigation so that the agents could obtain additional authorization,
Carpenter continued to provide the FBI with additional analysis of the
information that he initially collected.14o According to Carpenter, FBI
agent Christine Pas praised Carpenter for his contributions, 141 noting
that Carpenter's work "could very well impact national security at the
highest levels."142 In March 2005, after months of correspondence,
the FBI suddenly ceased to communicate with Carpenter; an action
which surprised Carpenter.143 A source in federal law enforcement
told TIME Magazine that while the FBI was working with Carpenter,
the agency was simultaneously investigating Carpenter and his cyber
activities.144
Despite the apparent value of Carpenter's work, Sandia did not
welcome news of Carpenter's after-hour cyber activities. Carpenter
explained that after the FBI contacted Sandia to discuss the extent of
Carpenter's activities, Sandia fired Carpenter and stripped him of his
Q security clearance.145 Ultimately, the United States Attorney elected
not to press charges against Carpenter. Because Carpenter believed
that the military, FBI, and to some extent, Sandia, unofficially
encouraged him to continue his work, Carpenter felt betrayed by their
respective actions. Consequently, in August 2005, Carpenter filed in
New Mexico State court a lawsuit against Sandia for defamation and
wrongful termination. Subsequently, the jury awarded Carpenter $4.3
million in punitive damages, $350,000 for emotional distress, and
more than $36,000 for lost wages, benefits, and other costs.146
'39 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
m4 Thornburgh, supra note 116.
145 Id.
146 Jaikumar Vijayan, Reverse Hacker Wins $4.3M in Suit Against Sandia Labs,
COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 14,2007,
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasi&taxonom
yName=standards and legal-issues&articleld=9o11283.
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C. THE PROOF IS IN THE PUDDING
Carpenter's description of the cyber hackers' proficiency and sense
of purpose is not an exaggeration. Consider this series of coordinated
attacks on American interests. On November 11, 2004, at 10:23 PM
Pacific Standard Time ("PST"), Chinese hackers detected a
vulnerability at the United States Army Information Systems
Engineering Command at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.147 At 1:19AM PST,
hackers then attacked the same vulnerability in computers at the
military's Defense Information Systems Agency in Arlington,
Virginia.148 Again, at 3:25 AM PST, the hackers hit the Naval Ocean
Systems Center, a defense department installation in San Diego,
California.149 And again, at 4:46 AM PST, the hackers penetrated the
Army's Space and Strategic Defense Installation in Huntsville,
Alabama. 150 Regarding these attacks, Allen Paller, director of the
SANS Institute, stated:
The precision of the attacks, the perfection of the
methods and the 24-by-seven operations over two and
a half years, and the number of workstations involved
are simply not replicated in the amateur criminal
community .... [T]his is an order of magnitude more
disciplined than anything I have seen out of the hacker
or amateur criminal community.151
Paller noted that "[t]hese attacks come from someone with intense
discipline .... [These hackers] were in and out with no keystroke
errors and left no fingerprints, and created a backdoor in less than
147 Nathan Thornburgh, Inside the Chinese Hack Attack, TIME, Aug. 25, 2005,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/o,8599,1o98371,oo.html.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
15' Larry Greenemeier, China's Cyber Attacks Signal New Battlefield Is Online, SCIENTIFIC
AMER., Sept. 18, 2007, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articlelD=lA9C21oF-E7F2-
99DF-3C85F17B168o98oD&sc=I0oo322 (statement of Alan Paller, Director of Research at
the SANS ("SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security") Institute, which trains and certifies
technology workers in cyber security).
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thirty minutes. How can this be done by anyone other than a military
organization?"152
More recently, in June 2007, cyber hackers attacked the computer
networks servicing the Pentagon. The Pentagon acknowledged that
this particular cyber attack forced officials to shut down computers
that served the office of Defense Secretary Robert Gates.153 Although
the Pentagon did not confirm the exact number of affected computers,
estimates placed the number around 1,500.154 Regarding the attacks,
Secretary Gates stated, "Elements of the OSD unclassified e-mail
system were taken offline yesterday afternoon, due to a detected
penetration."'55 Characterized as the most successful cyber attack to
date on the United States Defense Department,156 a person familiar
with the attack said the officials believe with a "very high level of
confidence . .. trending towards total certainty" that the People's
Liberation Army of China ("PLA") perpetrated the June 2007
attack.57
Gates also offered this sobering comment: "The reality is that the
Defense Department is constantly under attack . . .hundreds of
attacks" per day.158 For example, in 2005, the Pentagon recorded
more than 79,000 attempted intrusions. Approximately 1,300 of such
attempts were successful, including the penetration of systems linked
to the Army's 8 2 nd and lOlst Airborne Divisions and the 4th Infantry
Division.159 Furthermore, more attempts to scan the systems that
152 Hacker Attacks in US Linked to Chinese Military: Researchers, BREITBART.COM,
Dec. 12, 2005, http://lists.jammed.com/ISN/2005/12/oo59.html.
153 Katherine Noyes, Pentagon Shrugs Off Cyber-Attack, TECH NEWS WORLD, June 22,
2007, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/5799o.html.
154 Id.
'55 Interview with Robert M. Gates, Sec. of Defense & Peter Pace, Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen.,
Arlington, Va. (June 21, 2007), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3996.
156 Demetri Sevastopulo & Richard McGregor, Chinese Military Hacked into Pentagon,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 3, 2007,
http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=chinese+hacked&aje=true8dd=0709O3o8457&
ct=o.
157 Id.
158 Noyes, supra note 153.
159 Tim Reid, China's Cyber Army is Preparing to March on America, Says Pentagon,
TIMES ONLINE, Sept. 8, 2007,
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serve the Defense Department originate in China than in any other
country in the world.160
Alex Neill, the head of the Asia Security Programme at the Royal
United Services Institute, described the June 2007 attack on the
Pentagon as the "most flagrant and brazen to date." 16i Neill
characterized this attack as "pressure point warfare[;]" a new PLA
strategy comprising the identification and attack of specific targets
that will paralyze the adversary. 62 Specifically, China is integrating
into its military operations "information warfare units" that have the
capability for "first strikes against enemy networks." 163 Peter W.
Rodman, the United States Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, summarized the current situation:
We all know how great the Chinese people are at
information technology. And the People's Liberation
Army is tapping into some of that expertise to make
significant strides in cyber warfare and China is
exploring not only defensive activities defending its
computer networks from attack but is also exploring
offensive operations against an adversary's computer
networks.164
Richard Lawless, the Pentagon's top Asia official at the time of the
June 2007 attack, likened these cyber attacks to "multiple wake-up
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech-and web/the web/article24o9865.ec
e.
16o Bradley Graham, Hackers Attack Via Chinese Web Sites, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/o8/24/AR2005o82402318_pf.html.
161 Richard Norton-Taylor, Titan Rain - How Chinese Hackers Targeted Whitehall, THE
GUARDIAN, Sept. 5, 2007,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/sep/04/news.internet.
162 Id.
163 DEPT. OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 35-36 (2OO6), available at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/pdfs/China%2oReport%2o2o6.pdf.
164 Peter W. Rodman, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,
Keynote Address at the Chicago Society Symposium: China and the Future of the World
(Apr. 29, 2oo6), available at
http://chicagosociety.uchicago.edu/china/coverage/RodmanSpeech.pdf.
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calls stirring us to levels of more aggressive vigilance."165 He noted
that although the PLA regularly probes American military networks,
the penetration in June raised concerns to a new level because the
Pentagon attack demonstrated that China could disrupt important
military systems at a critical time.166
IV. THE MOUNTING TENSION BETWEEN CONGREE AND THE
DEPARTMENT
Since its inception, the Department's relationship with Congress
has, at best, been strained. In 2002, the U.S. House of
Representatives created the Committee on Homeland Security. The
House of Representatives charged the Committee with the task of
providing Congressional oversight for the Department's development.
On January 4, 2005, the first day of the lo9th Congress, Congress
made the Committee a permanent standing committee. 167 The
Committee then adopted a set of operating rules.168
Congress recognized that the Department's hierarchy created
problems with the nation's cybersecurity leadership. Following the
series of resignations that included Yoran Amit and Robert Liscouski,
Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) concluded, "Quite simply, our
nation has been without adequate leadership on cybersecurity since
Howard Schmidt resigned the cybersecurity czar position in 2003."169
According to Lofgren, the Nation's top cybersecurity position was now
"a 'directorship' buried within the bureaucracy of Homeland
Security."170 She explained that since Yoran's resignation, "Homeland
Security has contracted out the position to an acting director who is
being paid $577,000 under a two-year contract. That is almost a
16s Sevastopulo & McGregor, supra note 156.
166 Id.
167 United States H.R. Comm. on Homeland See., About the Committee,
http://hsc.house.gov/about/index.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
168 United States H.R.Comm. on Homeland Sec., Committee Rules,
http://hsc.house.gov/documents/chsrulesiloth.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
,69 Zoe Lofgren, Rescinding my Applause for Chertoff, CNET NEWS, July 13, 2006,
http://www.news.com/rescinding-my-applause-for-Chertoff/2OlO-1O28_3-6o93654.html.
See also discussion, supra notes 47-65.
170 Id.
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quarter million more than Chertoff is being paid as the top official at
the department. Meanwhile, cyberspace remains vulnerable."171 On
September 14, 2004, Representatives Lofgren and Mac Thornberry
(R-TX) introduced into the House of Representatives H.R. 5068, titled
the Department of Homeland Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of
2004. Section 203 of H.R. 5o68 read: "There shall be in the
Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection a
National Cybersecurity Office headed by an Assistant Secretary for
Cybersecurity . . . who shall assist the Secretary in promoting
cybersecurity for the Nation.172 On September 24, 2004, the House
of Representative referred H.R. 5o68 to the House Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development;173 however,
the end of the congressional term prevented any further action
regarding the bill.174 When, in January 2005, the 109th Congress took
office, Representatives Lofgren and Thornberry re-introduced into the
House the bill as H.R. 285.175
A. THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY DEMANDS
ANSWERS
To assess the Department's awareness and responsiveness to
emerging cyber threats, on April 30, 2007, the House Committee on
Homeland Security mailed to Scott Charbo, the Department's Chief
Information Officer ("CIO") a letter requesting the answers to several
probing questions.7 6 When the Committee learned that, during fiscal
171 Id.
172 Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2004, H.R. 5o68,
io8th Cong. § 203 (2004), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/io8/h/h5o68.pdf.
173 See The Library of Congress: Thomas, H.R. 5o68, http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?dio8:h.r.o5o68:.
174 See id.
175 Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R. 285,
109th Cong. (2005), available at http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?dio9:h.r.00285:.
176 Letter from Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Security, James
R. Langevin, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science
and Technology, to Scott Charbo, Chief Information Officer, Department of Homeland
Security (Apr- 30, 2007), available at
http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/Charbo.pdf.
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years 2005 and 2006, the Department networks experienced 844
"cybersecurity incidents," 177 Representative Langevin responded, "[i]t
was a shock and a disappointment to learn that the Department of
Homeland Security-the agency charged with being the lead in our
national cybersecurity-has suffered so many significant security
incidents on its networks."7 8 But, others in the industry believe that
the number of incidents is much higher. For example, Allen Paller
said that the "reality is that the federal agencies don't report all of
them. Eight hundred and forty-four is a big number, but it's a sample
of the reality, not the total reality."179 Paller cautioned, "You don't
know about all of them. That I can guarantee. And in particular,
you're not knowing about the worst ones." 180 Paller explained that in
cases of "really embarrassing event[s]," many agencies believe that
"it's less of a problem to not tell, than to tell and be beaten up about
it."181
As the congressional investigation continued, the Committee
noted that there was an uncanny similarity between the attacks on the
network systems servicing the Department's systems and recent
attacks on the network systems of the Commerce Department. 18 2
Specifically, the Committee noticed recurring patterns of infection
'77 Hacking the Homeland: Investigating Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities at the Department
of Homeland Security: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, lloth Cong.
(2007) (statement of James R. Langevin, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Homeland Security
Emerging Threats, Cyberscurity, and Science and Technology), available at
http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/2oo7o62o144327-44568.pdf. The affected
networks serviced the Department headquarters as well as networks servicing Immigration
and Customs Enforcement and Federal Emergency Management Agency.
178 Id.
179 Sharon Gaudin, Feds' Own Hacker Cracks Homeland Security Network, INFo.WK.,
June 21, 2007,
http://www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=QP2ZKN2L25KZY
QSNDLRSKHoCJUNN2JVN?articleID=1999o6o38&pgno=l&queryText=.
180 Id.
181 Id.
,2 Letter from Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Security, and
James R. Langevin, Chairman, H. Subcomm. of Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and
Science and Technology, to Richard L. Skinner, Inspector General, Department of
Homeland Security
(Sept. 21, 2007), available at http://hsc.house.gov/SiteDocuments/2oo7o9241o4629-
96412.pdf.
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that included password dumping utilities and other Trojan horse
activity with suspicious beaconing activity.,8 3 This beaconing activity
suggests the placement inside a computer of malicious code, which is
attempting to communicate with an outside entity.18 4 Consequently,
the Committee concluded that the "Department is the victim not only
of cyber attacks initiated by foreign entities, but of incompetent and
possibly illegal activity by the contractor charged with maintaining
security on its networks."185
During a private conversation, and again at a June 20, 2007
hearing, titled Hacking the Homeland: Investigating Cybersecurity
Vulnerabilities at the Department of Homeland Security,
Representative Langevin asked Charbo two questions. 186 First,
whether Charbo and his security team requested or received
intelligence briefings regarding the penetration of federal networks by
Chinese hackers. Second, whether the Department computers
exfiltrated information to Chinese servers. Charbo's response, which
included the statement "you don't know what you don't know,"
suggested to the Committee that "neither he nor the rest of the
Department was taking this issue seriously ."187 Langevin
concluded:
The fact is, DHS is failing to dedicate adequate funding
to network security. The finances show that Mr. Charbo
and the Department's leadership continue to
underinvest in IT security. Mr. Charbo cut funding for
the Chief Information Security Officer and only slightly
increased the IT security budget. Experts agree that
agencies should allocate around 20% of their IT
budgets to cybersecurity, and yet DHS is only spending
6.8% to secure their systems. And all of this is
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
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happening while the Department's IT budget was
increased by $1 billion last year.188
In an attempt to defend the Department, Charbo explained that by the
end of the year 2007, the Department will have spent $4.9 billion for
information technology, including $332 million for IT security. 189
Charbo also noted that the Department planned to ask for $5.2 billion
for the year 2008, including $342 million or 6.8% for security.19o
Unsatisfied by Charbo's response, Representative Langevin concluded
that Department's leadership continued to under-invest in
information technology.19'
Representative Thompson also expressed his outrage, and
explained that the Department's "'[d]o as I say, not as I do' policy is a
recipe for disaster." Thompson warned that if the Department was
serious about cyber risks, then it "need[ed] to start acting and stop
posturing."192
How can the Department of Homeland Security be a
real advocate for sound cybersecurity practices without
following some of its own advice? How can we expect
improvements in private infrastructure cyberdefense
when DHS bureaucrats aren't fixing their own
configurations? How can we ask others to invest in
upgraded security technologies when the Chief
Information Officer grows the Department's IT security
budget at a snail's pace? How can we ask the private
18 Hacking the Homeland: Investigating Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities at the Department
of Homeland Security, supra note 177.
189 Hacking the Homeland: Investigating Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities at the Department
of Homeland Security: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, lloth Cong.
(2007) (statement of Scott Charbo, Chief Information Office, Department of Homeland
Security), available at http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/2oo7o62o1444o3-
36627.pdf.
190 Id.
'9' Hacking the Homeland: Investigating Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities at the Department
of Homeland Security, supra note 177.
192 Hacking the Homeland: Investigating Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities at the Department
of Homeland Security: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 11oth Cong.
(2007) (statement of Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Security),
available at http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/2oo7o62o14435o-15564.pdf.
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sector to better train employees and implement more
consistent access controls when DHS allows employees
to send classified emails over unclassified networks and
contractors to attach unapproved laptops to the
network? 193
Thompson explained that Charbo did not "convince [him] that he's
serious about fixing the vulnerabilities in our systems." 194 Quoting
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Thompson told Charbo and the Department,
"What you do speaks so loud that I cannot hear what you say."195
B. THE GOVERNMENT HACKS THE DEPARTMENT
As the federal government's top hacker, Keith A. Rhodes has a
congressional mandate to test the network security of twenty-four
different federal agencies and departments.196 Each year, Rhodes, the
GAO's Chief Technologist and Director of its Center for Technology
and Engineering, performs ten penetration tests on these agencies and
departments. For approximately one year, Rhodes tested the
Department's network. 197 During a congressional hearing, Rhodes
discussed the disturbing results of his investigation. When asked
about the cybersecurity of the U.S. Visit program, Rhodes responded:
Security issues are pervasive. As matter of fact, I
realize that there was an earlier statement that our
audit was a year old, but actually our audit started a
year ago. As matter of fact, we curtailed our
assessment since we kept getting more and more
findings. If we continued to this day, we would still be
finding problems. The problems are pervasive and
systemic. Actually, a lot could be fixed. Systems were
out of date or misconfigured. A lot of them are zero
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Gaudin, supra note 179.
197 Id.
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cost fixes. I reiterate the systems are run by
contractors.198
Lofgren then asked, "Was the U.S. Visit database hacked?" Rhodes
explained that he "did not see controls in place that would prevent [an
intrusion] and did not see defensive perimeter and detection systems
in place to tell whether it had or had not been hacked."199
Rhodes further noted that certain Department systems were
"riddled with significant information security control weaknesses that
placed sensitive and personally identifiable information at increased
risk of unauthorized disclosure and modification, misuse, and
destruction possibly without detection, and place program operations
at increased risk of disruption. '"200 He further admitted that "[t]o
understand how the system was set up and what it was doing, we had
to talk to contractors. '"201
In a post-hearing interview, Rhodes offered that he "would label
[the Department] as being at high risk. There was no system we tested
that didn't have problems. There was nothing we touched that didn't
have weaknesses ...."202 Finally, Rhodes admitted that "[i]f we had
continued the audit we would have found more.., we just ran out of
room in our basket." 203 The implications of this testimony are
unsettling. Representative Langevin summarized Rhodes compelling
testimony as follows:
What does this mean? It means that terrorists or
nation states could be hacking Department of
Homeland Security databases, changing or altering
their names to allow them access to this country, and
we wouldn't even know that they were doing it. If we
198 Ryan Singel, Lofgren Asks if US VISIT Hacked; Wired Has ProofAnswer is Yes,
WIRED, June 20, 2007, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2oo7/o6/lofgren-asksif.html.
199 Id.
200 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION SECURITY: HOMELAND SECURITY
NEEDS TO ENHANCE EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS PROGRAM 10 (2007),
http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/2oo7o62o14444o-8o444.pdf.
201 Gaudin, supra note 179.
202 Id.
203 Id.
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care about protecting our homeland from dangerous
people, we have to care about the security of the
information that we use to accomplish that missions.2O4
C. THE COMMITTEE GETS THE DEPARTMENT'S INSPECTOR GENERAL
INVOLVED
The Committee's investigation continued with a September 21,
2007 letter to Richard L. Skinner, the Department's Inspector General
("IG"). 205 In the letter, the Committee detailed a series of cyber
incidents that occurred at the Department, which included the
"placement of a hacking tool, a password dumping utility, and other
malicious code on over a dozen computers."206 Furthermore, despite
the fact that hackers exfiltrated information from the Department's
systems to a web hosting system that connected to Chinese websites,
the Department did not notice these intrusions for months after the
attacks transpired. 207 Government contractors provided to the
Department inaccurate and misleading information regarding the
source of the cyber attacks, and attempted to hide gaps in their
security capabilities. 208 Lastly, when the Department finally
recognized the extent of these cyber attacks, the Department preferred
to complete the fiscal year's financial transactions rather than take
immediate steps to mitigate the problems.209
Before ending the letter, the Committee reminded the Inspector
General that, "as you know, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 makes it a crime to
knowingly and willingly make a materially false, fictitious or
fraudulent statement or representation to the United States
government." 210 In short, if the Department determined that
violations of federal law had occurred, then the Committee expected
204 Hacking the Homeland: Investigating Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities at the
Department of Homeland Security, supra note 177.
205 Letter from Thompson & Langevin, supra note 182.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
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the Department to report to the Justice Department those violations
and the offending parties.211 Finally, the Committee lamented, "[W]e
are disappointed by the Department's misleading responses to the
Committee's requests for information, and request that you determine
whether the intent of these misstatements was to obstruct the
Committee's investigation."212
D. THE COMMITTEE ADVISES THE DEPARTMENT NOT TO Go IT ALONE
On October 22, 2007, Representative Thompson sent Secretary
Chertoff a letter demanding information regarding certain
Department activities "that-if undertaken-will have a major impact
on the cybersecurity posture of the United States."213 Specifically,
Thompson noted that on September 22, 2007, the Baltimore Sun
discussed an interagency cyber initiation between the National
Security Agency and the Department. 214 Thompson's frustration with
the Department's lack of communication was obvious. Thompson
wrote, "On at least four separate occasions, my staff has tried to
schedule briefings from the department on this effort. Each time, the
department refused to do sO."215 At an October 17, 2007 hearing,
Thompson asked Assistant Secretary Greg Garcia to provide the
Committee with information regarding this initiative, but "[a]gain, my
request was met with silence . . . . I certainly hope that the
Department does not plan to go forward with this program without
fully briefing this Committee .... ,6
The Department's spokesperson, Laura Keehner, refuted
Thompson's allegation. Keehner noted that, in the past year, the
Department met with the Committee more than six times to discuss
cybersecurity and related issues. 217 "We have continually kept
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Letter from Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Security, to
Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (Oct. 22, 2007), available
at http://hsc.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20071o24o93549-o9517.pdf.
214 Id.
215 Id
.
216 Id.
217 Jason Miller, Rep. Thompson Presses DHS for Information on Cyber Initiative, FED.
COMPUTER WK., Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.fcw.com/online/news/15o595-1.html.
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members of Congress involved and will continue to do so. We will
respond to his letter in a timely fashion."218
More recently, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs locked horns over the Comprehensive National
Security Initiative ("CNCI"). On January 8, 2008, President Bush
approved National Security Presidential Directive 54 (also Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 23). The Directive formalized a multi-
agency, multi-year plan that establishes twelve steps to securing the
government's cyber networks. 219 On March 20, 2008, Secretary
Chertoff announced the appointment of Rod Beckstrom as the first
Director of the National Cyber Security Center ("NCSC"). 220
According to the Department, the NCSC "will bring together federal
cybersecurity organizations, by virtually connecting and in some
cases, physically collocating personnel and resources to gain a clearer
understanding of the overall cybersecurity picture of Federal
networks." 221 Chertoff explained that Beckstrom's tasks included
"coordinating cybersecurity efforts and improving situational
awareness and information sharing across the federal government."222
As a co-author of The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable
Power of Leaderless Organization,223 a book that discusses the power
of decentralized networks in organizations and presents a new model
218 Id.
219 See Dep't of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: Protecting Our Federal Networks Against Cyber
Attacks, April 8, 2008, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_12o7684277498.shtm; see
also Letter from Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, to Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
(May 1, 2oo8), available at
http ://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease
_id=a32aball-4443-4577-b9a5-3b2ea2c2f826&Affiliation=C.
220 Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Statement by Homeland Security
Secretary Michael Chertoff on the Appointment of the Director of the National Cyber
Security Center (March 20, 2oo8), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_12o6o47924712.shtm.
221 See Dep't of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet, supra note 219.
222 Homeland Security Press Release, supra note 220. According to Chertoff, "Rod has
over 25 years of experience in designing and implementing new Internet technologies. He
brings to the department a specialized Internet expertise, and unique entrepreneurial and
creative business thinking." Id.
223 ORI BRAFMAN & ROD A. BECKSTROM. THE STARFISH AND THE SPIDER: THE UNSTOPPABLE
POWER OF LEADERLESS ORGANIZATIONS (2008).
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for analyzing organizations, leadership style and competitive strategy,
Beckstrom's appointment was promising.24
Nevertheless, the Senate Committee chastised the Department for
its failure to be more forthcoming with respect to the CNCI. For
example, the Senate Committee explained that the Department had
publicly revealed information that had been previously presented to
Senate Committee staff as classified. Furthermore, prior to Chertoffs
March 20, 2008 appointment of Beckstrom as the Director of the
NCSC, Senate Committee staff had been instructed that the existence
of the NCSC itself was classified. Thus, the Senate Committee
provided the Department with a series of questions regarding the
NCSC, contracting, classification, role of the public, metrics, private
sector, privacy impact assessments, and other responsibilities of the
Department.2 2 5
E. THE ACCUSATIONS OF OBSTRUCTION
Some have wondered whether the Department obstructed
investigations regarding its activities. In February 2007, David
Walker, the Comptroller General of the United States, testified at a
hearing titled An Overview of Issues and Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security. Walker explained:
DHS has not made its management or operational
decisions transparent enough so that Congress can be
sure it is effectively, efficiently, and economically using
the billions of dollars in funding it receives
annually . . . . Our work . . . has been significantly
hampered by long delays in granting us access to
224 Less than one year after his appointment, Beckstrom resigned as Director of NSNC. See
Jaikumar Vijayan, Federal Cybersecurity Director Quits, Complains of NSA Role,
COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 8, 2009,
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleld
=9129218. The Wall Street Journal published Beckstrom's resignation letter, available at
http://online.wsj .com/public/resources/documents/BeckstromResignation.pdf.
225 Press Release, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
Lieberman and Collins Step Up Scrutiny of Cyber Security Initiative: Secrecy, Overuse of
Contractors, Role of Private Sector at Stake (May 2, 20o8), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction= PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease
_id=a32aball-4443-4577-b9a5-3b2ea2c2f826&Affiliation=C.
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program documents and officials, or by questioning our
access to information needed to conduct our reviews.22 6
Walker continued, "While much of its sensitive work needs to be
guarded from improper disclosure, DHS has not been receptive
towards oversight and its delays in providing Congress and us with
access to various documents and officials have impeded our work."227
He lamented, "When you have more lawyers in a meeting than
program people, you know you got a problem. Something needs to be
done about this."228 Walker suggested that the involvement of the
Department's General Counsel in such investigatory proceedings
should be an exception rather than the rule.229 "Right now the system
is structured to delay, delay, delay .... We haven't had a situation
where they refuse information but it might take months to get it."230
Because all requests had to go through the General Counsel's office,
Walker also faced "systemic" and "persistent" problems trying to
obtain documents from the Department. 231 Following Walker's
testimony, Representative David Price (D-NC), offered this sentiment
of comfort: "You can be assured that we hear you loud and clear."232
Nevertheless, a department spokesman characterized as "baseless" the
suggestion that the General Counsel's office blocked access to
Department information. The spokesperson continued, "The
department goes to great lengths to facilitate information sharing with
the IG and GAO. I'm confident that the IG and GAO appreciate that
there can be instances when it makes sense to have department
counsel involved, especially when it relates to how sensitive
information is treated. ' 233
226 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HOMELAND SECURITY: MANAGEMENT AND
PROGRAMMATIC CHALLENGES FACING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 23 (2007),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do7398t.pdf.
227 Id. at 3-4.
228 Chris Strohm, Watchdogs say Homeland Security Office has Delayed Probes, GOV'T
EXECUTIVE, Feb. 6, 2007, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/o2o7/o2o6o7cdpml.htm.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
36o [VOL 5:2
MCFADYEN
V. THE DEPARTMENT'S LINKS TO NEPOTISM AND CRONYISM
For such a young agency, accusations of nepotism and cronyism
plague the Department of Homeland Security.234 The GAO noted that
"[a]s DHS strives to fulfill its mission, it faces key challenges in
building its credibility as a stable, authoritative, and capable
organization and in leveraging private and public assets and
information in order to clearly demonstrate the value it can provide."
235
Although there are numerous examples of appointees that
seemingly benefit from cronyism and nepotism-including the Vice-
President's son-in-law Philip Perry, the Department's former General
Counsel-this article limits its discussion to one of President Bush's
more recent and provocative appointments. On January 4, 2006,
President Bush appointed Julie L. Myers to the position of Assistant
Secretary for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE").236
As ICE employs more than 15,000 individuals, including 6,ooo
investigators, and has an annual budget in excess of $4 billion, Ms.
234 Shane Harris, Homeland Security Could Face Transition Problem, NAT'L J., June 1,
2007, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/o6o7/o6olo7nji.htm. Individuals possessing
questionable qualifications appear to fill important positions within the Department.
Consider the following examples. Andrew Maner, a former staffer to President George
H.W. Bush, became the Department's Chief Financial Officer. Id. Although this is a
position that oversees multibillion-dollar budget, Maner could not readily produce
evidence of credentials in accounting and finance on his resume. Id. Similarly, Douglas
Hoelscher, a former White House staffer and Republican campaign aide, was only 28 years
old when he became executive director of the Homeland Security Advisory Committee
("HSAC"). Id. The HSAC gathers advice on critical issues such as protecting the nation's
infrastructure and countering weapons of mass destruction. At the time of his
appointment, Hoelscher allegedly did not have management experience, but was acting as
the Department's liaison to the White House. Id. A Homeland Security spokeswoman
observed that Holescher "made sure [that political appointees] were all placed in the office
where they were happiest and ... fit best.") Id. At the time that Garcia became the first
Assistant Secreatry of Cybersecurity and Telecommunications, Andy Purdy was a two-year
contract employee on loan from Carnegie Mellon University. Declan McCullagh,
Homeland Security Fills Top Cybersecurity Post, CNET NEWS, Sept. 18, 2006,
http://www.news.com/Homeland-Security-fills-top-cybersecurity-post/21oo-7348-3-
6116975.html. Purdy had become the Acting Director of NCSD in the wake of Yoran's
sudden resignation. Id. Purdy, who has been criticized for taking the job of running a
department that awarded at least $19 million in contracts to his university employer this
year, was the acting cybersecurity chief. Id.
235 CRICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, supra note 28, at 18.
236 Department of Homeland Security, Official Biography of Julie L. Myers,
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/biography-o149.shtm.
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Myers leads the Department's largest investigative component. 237
Prior to her 2006 appointment, Myers served as special assistant to
the President for presidential personnel. She also served as an
assistant secretary for Export Enforcement at the Department of
Commerce, and was an associate at Mayer, Brown & Platt in Chicago,
Illinois.238
For several reasons, many found Myers' appointment
disconcerting. First, "Given the importance of the position and a
history of mismanagement in the immigration service," Congress took
the unusual step of statutorily requiring that the Assistant Secretary of
the Bureau of Border Security to "have a minimum of 5 years
professional experience in law enforcement, and a minimum of 5
years of management." 239 Second, Myers' most relevant prior
experience amounted to "managing only 170 employees and a $25
million budget while at the Commerce department."240 Third, Myers'
appointment smacked of cronyism. Myers is the niece of Air Force
General Richard B. Myers, the former Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of
Staff,241 and, at the time of the appointment, the wife of John F. Wood,
Secretary Chertoffs then Chief of Staff.242
Regarding Myers' appointment, Charles Showalter, President of
the National Homeland Security Council, a union that represents
7,800 ICE agents, officers and support staff, remarked: "It appears
she's got a tremendous amount of experience in money laundering, in
banking and the financial areas, [b]ut my question is: Who the hell is
going to enforce the immigration laws?" 243 Similarly, during
Congressional hearings, Senator Voinovich (R-OH) told Myers that
"I'd really like to have [Secretary Chertoff] spend some time with us,
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Homeland Security Act of 2002, § 442.
240 Editorial, Withdraw Myers, NAT'L REv., Sept. 22, 2005,
http://www.nationalreview.com/editorial/editors200509221416.asp.
241 Michelle Malkin, Not Another Homeland Security Hack, JEWISH WORLD REV.,
Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.jewishworldreview.com/michelle/malkino92lo5.php3.
242 Id.
243 Dan Eggen & Spencer S. Hsu, Immigration Nominee's Credentials Questioned, WASHI.
POsT, Sept. 20, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/o9/19/AR2005o919o193o.html.
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telling us personally why he thinks you're qualified for the job,
because based on the resume, I don't think you are."244 Nevertheless,
Myers' recess appointment245 escaped the Senate's full consideration
and from January 2006 until November 2008, Myers served as the
Assistant Secretary.246 As one political commentator concluded, the
nation recently learned two very valuable lessons regarding homeland
security. First, "[i]f you appoint political cronies in a time crisis, you
will regret it." 247 Second, "[c]ronyism and national security are a
deadly mix."248 The Department appears to exemplify both of these
lessons.
VI. THE DEPARTMENT'S ONGOING LEADERSHIP CRISIS
Representative Thompson once remarked that "Homeland
Security was bruised when the country learned that Michael Brown,
an Arabian Horse aficionado, was running FEMA."249 Adding insult to
244 Id.
245 Press Release, Harry Reid, Recess Appointment of Julie Myers Sends Mixed Messages
on Border Security (Jan. 5, 20o6), available at
http://democrats.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=25o483&. The press release
stated:
President Bush's decision to recess appoint Julie L. Myers to the Immigration
and Customs Enforcement Bureau sends mixed messages about his real
commitment to protect our nation and find a realistic solution to the immigration
problems that our nation faces. While the President often talks about the need to
protect our borders, Ms. Myers background raises serious questions about her
ability to fulfill ICE's important work of preventing the entrance of terrorists and
people who want to harm us. I am deeply concerned that the President has
handed a key appointment to someone who is not prepared to assume the
responsibility of managing such an important agency.
246 In October 2007, The Senate Judiciary Committee voted to confirm Myers, as did the
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in September. See also
Spencer Hsu, Bush Immigration ChiefJulie Myers Out, Wash. Post, Nov. 5, 2o08,
http://voices.washingtonpost.cOm/44/2oo8/11/05/bush-immigration-chief-julie-m.ht
ml.
247 Malkin, supra note 241.
248 Id.
249 Press Release, H. Committee on Homeland Security, Vacancy Report Finds Homeland
Security and Continuity of Government at Risk (July 9, 2007), available at
http://homeland.house.gov/press/index.asp?ID=237.
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injury, the Department's leadership woes are compounded by its
employment infrastructure. For example, as of May 1, 2007, the
Department maintains 575 executive positions.25° 138 of these 575
executive positions, or 24%, were vacant. 25' This paucity of senior
officials "directly impairs our homeland security and our readiness."252
Department officials argue that the recent addition of seventy-three
senior executive service positions unfairly inflated this number of
vacancies. 253 But, some commentators were quick to dismiss the
Department's attempt to explain away these deficiencies, noting that
51% (70) of these positions were vacant with no explanation, 44% (61)
were under recruitment, 5% (7) tentative or pending appointees.
These vacancies notwithstanding, the year 2009 may challenge the
Department in new and unchartered ways. Tuesday, January 20,
2009 is Inauguration Day, a day which represents the first time since
its inception that the Department will exist under a presidential
administration other than the Bush administration. As of September
2004, the Department employed more than 18,ooo individuals,
including more than 360 politically appointed, non-career
positions. 254 By contrast, the Veterans Affairs Department, the
government's second-largest department with over 235,000
employees, has only sixty-four politically appointed, noncareer
positions. 255 The Defense Department, the largest government
department with over 2.1 million military and civilian employees,
maintains only 283 appointed, noncareer jobs.256 Those 283 jobs
include Army, Navy, and Air Force political appointees.257 Since
250 CRITICAL LEADERSHIP VACANCIES, supra note 7, at 3. At least eight agencies and
components have a vacancy rate greater than 24% including Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Policy (48%), Federal Emergency Management Agency (31%), U.S. Coast
Guard (29%), Office of the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence (36%).
251 Id.
252 Id. at 3.
253 The Department added these positions on March 1, 2007.
254 Harris, supra note 234.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
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2004, the Department has added political positions more frequently
than other large governmental departments.258
The Department's organization accounts for much of the anxiety
regarding the upcoming transition. Stephen Flynn, a leading expert
on the Department, noted that "Any of the other main Cabinet
departments have civil servants that step in" as acting officials during
a transition period.259 But, "Homeland Security doesn't have any of
those [servants] ... [a]nd that's extremely unusual."26o Since its
inception, the Department has promoted into senior, or even middle,
management positions very few career officials. 261 Consequently,
most of the responsibility for running the Department, and its
plethora of critical missions, resides in the people who will be walking
out the Department's front door as the Bush administration wanes or
will leave en masse after the 20o8 Presidential election. In short, the
"department virtually has no backbench."262
Michael P. Jackson, the Department's Deputy Secretary, expressed
a commitment to prevent such a leadership meltdown during the
transition period between administrations. Jackson confirmed that he
was drafting succession plans for "every operational component" of
the Department including the top layers of management.263 Jackson's
plan aimed to find talented career, nonpolitical employees that can
advance into senior level positions, and then serve in an acting
capacity during the transition of presidential administrations. 264
"We've gone throughout the entire organization and looked for people
like this to promote. We're trying to nurture a cadre of owners. I am
the part-time help at DHS."265 Nevertheless, Jackson admitted that it
is difficult to find and retain quality candidates. "We've had a
significant turnover. And that turnover has been below the top-level
258 Id.
259 Harris, supra note 234.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Harris, supra note 234.
265 Id.
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jobs as well... [but] I would say we are well beyond the halfway point
in what we have to get done."266
During a September 5, 2007 hearing, Secretary Chertoff told the
House Committee on Homeland Security that as the Bush
administration winds down, the Department's senior leadership
would remain intact. "I am confident that, again subject to limitations
of, you know, presidential pleasure and God's willingness, that the
senior leadership team we have in place does intend to stay on, and I
think we will shortly be filling the remaining gaps and vacancies."267
But less than three weeks later, Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson
resigned.268 In a September 24, 2007 e-mail to staff, Jackson wrote,
"The simple truth, however, is that after over five years of serving with
the President's team, I am compelled to depart for financial reasons
that I can no longer ignore."269 Incidentally, Jackson joined the
Department in March 2005, and at the time of his departure, earned
$168,ooo per year.270 In a press release, Secretary Chertoff noted that
"Michael is the longest serving Deputy Secretary at this department
and has devoted enormous energy, talent and thought into making it a
stronger, more integrated and mature organization." 271 Jackson
further asserted that his departure would not impede the
Department's progress. "I have been working very systematically to
make sure.., that the work doesn't drop one bit after my departure
.... Whoever is my successor is going to inherit a system in good
shape."272
Nevertheless, the Deputy Secretary's abrupt resignation elicited
concern from Representative Thompson. "Secretary Jackson's
266 Id.
267 Chris Strohm, Resignation of DHS Deputy Prompts Questions on Capitol Hill, GoV'T
EXE crIvE, Sept. 25, 2007, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/o9o7/o925o7cdam2.htm.
268 Eileen Sullivan, Homeland Security's Jackson Resigns, USA TODAY, Sept. 24, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-o9-24-3552264736_x.htm.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Press Release, Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff on the
Resignation of the Deputy Secretary (Sept. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr -9o66oo57092.shtm.
272 Rob Margetta, Pressure Points for the Department of Homeland Security, CQ WKLY.,
Oct. 22, 2007, http://public.cq.com/docs/cqw/weeklyreportllo-ooo0026o9418.html.
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departure reaffirms two things we've known for some time, that DHS
employees suffer from the lowest morale in the Federal workforce,
and that the Department's leadership has more holes than Swiss
cheese."273 Thompson added, "As we near a presidential transition,
and with security threats looming around every corner, I'm scared to
ask who Secretary Chertoff will turn to now.2 74
Deputy Secretary Jackson responded to Representative
Thompson's criticism in kind. In an October 19, 2007 letter to
Thompson, Jackson explained that "DHS's leadership team would
more fairly be compared to a fully intact wheel of the undisputed king
of cheeses, Parmigiano Reggiano, carefully nurtured to maturity and
ripe for superlative service."275 One week later, Thompson sent to the
Deputy Secretary another letter that had a tone that was far from
humorous. First, Thompson pointed out that if Jackson had accepted
the Committee's invitation to testify at the September 18, 2007
hearing titled The Grades are In!- Is the Department of Homeland
Security Measuring Up?, then Jackson "would have had the
opportunity at that time to address many of the issues that [he] now
raise[d]."276 Second, Thompson challenged Jackson's statement that
"there is not a single unfilled position among the most senior
members of the DHS management team."27 Specifically, Thompson
provided several examples of the "Department's apparent penchant
for requiring people to temporarily occupy different positions
simultaneously."278 Third, Thompson rebutted Jackson's claim that
273 Press Release, Thompson Responds to Jackson Resignation (Sept. 24, 2oo7), available
at
http://hsc.house.gov/press/index.asp?ID=27o&SubSection=o&Issue=o&DocumentType=
o&PublishDate=o.
274 Id.
275 Jonathan E. Kaplan, Dems Say DHS is Swiss Cheese; DHS Says it's Parm, THE HILL,
Nov. 2, 2007, http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/dems-say-dhs-is-swiss-cheese-dhs-
says-its-parm-2007-11-02.html.
276 Letter from Bennie G. Thompson, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Homeland Security,
to Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (Oct. 26, 2007),
available at http://www.hlswatch.com/sitedoes/thompson-to-jackson.pdf.
277 Id.
278Id.
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the Department is "ripe for superlative service." 279 Thompson
explained,
Let me be clear. I have no doubt that the
approximately i8oooo rank-and-file-employees who
serve in the Department, while beset by one of the
lowest employee satisfaction ratings in the Federal
workforce, valiantly strive to deliver superlative service.
My concern is that the leadership of the Department
does not provide that same level of performance. So, as
you depart, I want to provide you with a few examples
of my experience with your less than superlative service
as the senior level .... 280
Thompson then listed eight such examples of "superlative service."281
Thompson emphasized that "now is not the time for the Department
to rest. The American people deserve a Department that will
effectively perform now and in the years ahead. We all deserve much
more than we have received for the billions of dollars that the
Department has spent." 282 Thompson closed his letter in
unforgettable fashion. "So, as you leave, allow me to convey this
message to those who remain- to quote Benjamin Franklin, 'Never
confuse motion with action."'2 83
VII. THE DEPARTMENT'S PERVASIVE MISMANAGEMENT
A. THE DEPARTMENT'S PURCHASE CARD DEBACLE
In 2006, the GAO and the Department's Inspector General
completed a six-month long audit of Department's use of purchase
cards.28 4 Because auditors could not distinguish between hurricane-
279 Id.
280d.
281 Letter from Thompson, supra note 276.
282 d.
283 Id.
284 The joint audit progressed from November 2005 through June 2006, examined all
purchase card transactions at the Department that occurred from June 13, 2005 through
November 12, 2005. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PURCHASE CARDS: CONTROL
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related and non-hurricane-related purchases, the auditors evaluated
all purchases that occurred during this time frame.285 The audit's
message was clear. Poor oversight plagued the Department. Senator
Susan Collins (R-ME) noted, "It seems no matter where we look at
Homeland Security, we find a pattern of waste, fraud and abuse."286
According to Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY), the GAO report
showed "yet again that the Department of Homeland Security seems
to be sometime[s] run more like a college fraternity house, than an
agency meant to protect us from terror."287
The report provided a startling description of the Department's
financial disarray. Auditors noted that "inadequate staffing and
ineffective monitoring contributed to the weak control
environment .288 Despite the presence of nearly 14,000 purchase
cards, the Department "failed to assign sufficient resources to manage
WEAKNESSES LEAVE DHS HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO FRAUDULENT, IMPROPER, AND ABUSIVE
ACTIVITY 2 (2006) [hereinafter PURCHASE CARDS INVrrE VULNERABILITY], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do6957t.pdf.
285 Id.
286 Eric Lipton, Homeland Security Department Is Accused of Credit Card Misuse, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2oo6/o7/19/washington/9cards.html?ei=5o88&en=5e9ooobo
261c5602&ex=131o9616oo&adxnnl=l&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&adxnnlx=1164294012-
DXvgXm9ImuoTtQCqwkhFjA.
The TSA requested that the Defense Contract Audit Agency perform a TSA audit. The
results of the audit were shocking. When, in September 2003, the Transportation Security
Operations Center opened, the operations center had a 4,200 square foot gym at a cost of
$350,000 to accommodate the center's seventy-nine employees. The center also
maintained seven kitchens with sub-zero refrigerators, with each refrigerator costing
$3,000. The TSA's first director worked in an executive suite that cost $410,000. To
celebrate the TSA's first birthday, the agency hosted a party at a cost of $461,ooo. Sara
Kehaulani Goo, Probe Finds Overspending for TSA Center, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2399-2005Aprx9.html. The TSA also
paid (1) $1,140 for twenty gallons (or $3.69 per cup) of Starbucks coffee, (2) $1,540 to rent
fourteen extension cords at $5 per day for three weeks, (3) $514,210 to rent three tents that
flooded in a rain storm, (4) $377,273.75 in unsubstantiated long-distance phone calls, and
(5) $4.4 million in "no show" fees for job candidates who did not appear for tests. Scott
Higham & Robert O'Harrow Jr., The High Cost of a Rush to Security, WASH. POST,
June 30, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/o6/29/AR2005o62903o63.html.
287 Lara Jakes Jordan, Credit Card Fraud at DHS, HOMELAND SEC. WKLY., July 19, 2006,
http://www.homelandsecurityweekly.com/news/dhs-credit-fraud-o719o6.
288 PURCHASE CARDS INVITE VULNERABILITY, supra note 284, at 2.
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its purchase card program as evidenced by the fact that we found
numerous instances where approving officials assumed oversight
responsibilities for an excessive number of cardholders."289 While the
GAO guidelines dictate that the ratio of cardholders to approving
officials should not exceed seven to one, auditors located three
approving Department officials that were each individually
responsible for overseeing over thirty cardholders.290
This ineffective monitoring also manifested itself in other ways.
The report identified the holders of six purchase cards for which the
"approving official and the cardholder were the same individual,"
thereby resulting in a "major conflict of interest."291 The audit also
determined that the Department needlessly distributed to employees
purchase cards. The Office of Management and Budget and the
United States General Services Administration ("GSA") admonished
that "purchase cards should only be issued to individuals who have a
documented need to acquire items for the government with the
purchase card."292 But, as of December 13, 2005, the Department
actively maintained 2,468 open purchase cards that had not recorded
any activity in nearly a year's time.293 Finding it "difficult to argue
that the 2,468 individuals who have not made a single purchase in an
entire year have such a need," the report concluded that these
accounts "should have been closed to minimize the risk of fraud,
waste, and abuse."294
These GAO reports also identified several examples of "potentially
fraudulent, improper, and abusive or questionable transactions."295 In
one particularly egregious case of purchase card mismanagement,
289 Id.
290 Id. The GAO has issued an audit guide prescribing that the ratio of cardholders to
approving officials should not exceed seven to one.
291 Id. at 8.
292 According to the report, federal agency purchase card programs operate under a
government wide GSA SmartPay@ master contract. Agency purchase card programs must
comply with the terms of the contract and task orders under which the agency placed its
order for purchase card services. See PURCHASE CARDS INVITE VULNERABILrTY, supra note
284, at 8-9.
293 Id. at 8.
294 Id. at 9.
295 Id. at 3.
370 [Vol. 5:2
MCFADYEN
FEMA paid a vendor $208,000 to deliver twenty flat-bottom boats
needed for relief operations in New Orleans.296 Although this price
included the motors and trailers for the boat, the purchase price was
twice the normal retail price.297 Because the vendor did not physically
possess the boats, the vendor used the FEMA purchase card account
number to purchase the boats from various other retailers.298 The
vendor used the card number to make two unauthorized payments to
one retailer for six of the twenty boats, which payments totaled about
$30,000.299 In the end, FEMA had only eight of the twenty boats in
its property records and could not locate the other twelve boats,300 and
the GAO estimated that the vendor used this unauthorized FEMA
transaction to collect nearly $15o,o0o, including the profit that the
unscrupulous vendor acquired without paying the trusting retailer.3o1
These GAO reports collectively concluded that the Department
had not effectively managed its purchase card program, or the policies
that govern that program. The examiners could not examine over
10,339 transactions selected for audit, because Department
cardholders had not submitted the required supporting
documentation. 302 Consequently, based on the audit's sample of
purchases using Department purchase cards, the GAO "estimated that
45% did not have prior written authorization, 8% did not provide
required sales documentation, 63% did not have evidence that the
goods or services were actually received, and 53% did not give priority
to required or preferred vendors (designated sources).3o3 This lack of
oversight and control "allowed potentially fraudulent, improper, and
296 Id. at 21.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 PURCHASE CARDS INvITE VULNERABILITY, supra note 284, at 21.
300 Id.
301 Id. Although the vendor billed FEMA for all twenty of the boats, the vendor failed to pay
a retailer that provided eleven of the twenty boats. Because the retailer believed that the
vendor was a FEMA representative, the retailer provided the vendor with the boats without
requiring an up-front payment. The retailer has since reported the eleven boats as stolen
and has not provided the vendor title to the boats.
302 Id. at iO.
303 Id. at 4.
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abusive or questionable usage of these purchase cards to go
undetected."o4
The GAO audit likewise demonstrated that the Department
exercised poor control over the accountable property that the
Department acquired using purchase cards. 305 Auditors closely
examined the following FEMA purchases: (1) two hundred laptops for
$300,000, (2) twenty flat bottom boats for $177,ooo, (3) one hundred
printers for $84,0o0, and (4) twenty-five GPS units for $18,000.306
Auditors also examined the Coast Guard's purchase of three laptops
for $13,000.3o7 During the investigation, auditors could not locate
more than 107 of the 203 computers, twelve of the twenty flat-bottom
boats, twenty-two of the one hundred printers, and two of the twenty-
five GPS units.308 The missing computers, GPS units, and printers
purchased by FEMA cost the Department approximately $170,000.309
B. THE DEPARTMENT'S INCREDIBLE CONTRACTING WOES
In another report, the GAO focused on the Department's Ongoing
Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition Organization.310
Although the report recognized that interagency contracts provide the
Department with the "advantages of timeliness and efficiency," the
GAO cautioned that certain risk accompanied the improperly
managed contracts.3 1' Having spent over $6.5 billion on interagency
304 Id. at 30.
3o5 The Department's Personal Property Management Directive 565 defines accountable
property as personal property with an initial acquisition cost at or above a specific
threshold, and items designated as sensitive. These items are to be recorded in the
organization's automated control system. PURCHASE CARDS INVrrE VULNERABILITY, supra
note 284, at 18.
306 Id. at 19.
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: ONGOING
CHALLENGES IN CREATING AN EFFECTIVE ACQUISITION ORGANIZATION 1 (2007) [hereinafter
ONGOING CHALLENGES IN ACQUISITION], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do7948t.pdf.
311 Id. at 8.
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contracts during the fiscal year 2005, the GAO concluded that the
Department "did not systematically monitor or assess its use of
interagency contracts to determine whether this method provides
good outcomes for the department."312
Part of the Department's problem is the Department itself. The
report explains that of the twenty-two components that became part
of the Department, seven came with their own procurement
support. 13 One year later, in January 2004, the Department created
an eighth office-the Office of Procurement Operations-to provide to
a variety of Department components procurement support. 314 In
December 2005, the Chief Procurement Office ("CPO") established a
department wide acquisition oversight program.315 The Department
hoped that the program would provide comprehensive oversight of
each component's acquisitions, and disseminate throughout the
Department successful acquisition management strategies. 316
Although the GAO reported some progress "in increasing staff to
authorized levels," the report concluded that the CPO "lacks the
authority needed to ensure the department's components comply with
its procurement policies and procedures such as the acquisitions
oversight program."317
Prompted by this series of scathing GAO reports, the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs held a
hearing titled Is DHS Too Dependent on Contractors to Do the
Government's Work? On October 17, 2007, in his opening remarks,
Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) noted that while the GAO refrained
from making any conclusion regarding whether the Department
improperly allowed contractors to perform inherently governmental
work, the GAO determined that the Department's oversight plans
lacked "specific measures for assessing contractor performance."318
312 Id.
313 Id. at3.
314 Id.
315 ONGOING CHALLENGES IN ACQUISITION, supra note 310, at 3.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 6.
318 Is DHS Too Dependent on Contractors to Do the Government's Work?: Hearing Before
S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 11oth Cong. (2007)
(statement of Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security and
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Lieberman then described some of the questionable uses of
contractors. First, the Coast guard hired a contractor to aid in the
management of its competitive outsourcing program.3'9 In other
words, the Coast Guard hired a contractor to help the Coast Guard
determine whether the Coast Guard should use contractors. Second,
the Department awarded one contractor a $42.4 million contract to
support the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate. 320 Although the contract covered fifty-eight distinct
tasks, the Department assigned only one Department employee to
provide the contracting officer with relevant support. 321 Senator
Lieberman also noted that the "GAO's report leads us to question
whether DHS is really in control of these activities, or whether the
Department has been rubber-stamping too many decisions made by
contractors."322 In short, the Senator concluded that the Department's
"heavy reliance on contractors" may cause the Department to "lose
some of their critical ability to think and act on its own for the
American people."323
Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) echoed Senator
Lieberman's sentiments. Waxman explained that "federal
procurement decisions affect the lives of every American. Contractors
have become a 'shadow government,' an enormous workforce of
hundreds of thousands of people who perform a vast array of
government functions."324 In a 2006 report titled Dollars, Not Sense:
Governmental Affairs), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/lol7o7JILOpen.pdf.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Is DHS Too Dependent on Contractors to Do the Government's Work?, supra note 318.
In her opening statement, Senator Susan Collins quoted a handbook published by the
Office of Personnel Management. "Managers need to keep in mind that when they contract
out.., they are contracting out the work, not the accountability." Is DHS Too Dependent
on Contractors to Do the Government's Work? Before the S. Subcomm. on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, 11oth Cong. (2007) (statement of Susan M. Collins,
Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs), available
at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/117o7SMCOpen.pdf.
324 Rep. Henry A. Waxrnan, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform,
Remarks at the Center for American Progress' Forum on a Return to Competitive
Contracting (May 14, 2007), available at
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Government Contracting under the Bush Administration, Waxman
explained that federal contracting is the fastest growing aspect of the
government's discretionary budget. 325 Waxman complained that
when asked at a February 2007 hearing, the Department could not
determine how many contractors it employed. 326 Because the
Department's "lack of accountability and oversight is an invitation to
abuse," the House Oversight Committee launched an investigation
into the Department's use of contractors.3 27 Waxman explained,
"While government contractors are getting rich, the taxpayers are
getting soaked. Billions of dollars are being squandered while our
nation's most pressing needs have gone unmet. Major government
initiatives.., have been undermined by wasteful spending on federal
contracts."328
In an October 25, 2005 letter to Representative Tom Davis (R-
VA), Waxman pleaded for the Committee to "investigate reports of
egregious waste under contracts awarded and administered by the
Department of Homeland Security." 329 Waxman referred the
Committee's attention to a Washington Post article that divulged the
findings of a Pentagon audit.330 The Pentagon audit examined a $1
billion contract between Unisys and the Transportation Security
Administration ("TSA") to upgrade the computer networks serving the
nation's airports. Auditors discovered that Unisys may have
htttp://oversight.house.gov/documents/200705151214o2.pdf. In a 2oo6 report titled
Dollars, Not Sense: Government Contracting under the Bush Administration, Waxman
explained that federal contracting is the fastest growing aspect of the government's
discretionary budget. See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, DOLLARS, NOT
SENSE: GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION i (2oo6),
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/2oo6l2llOO757-98364.pdf.
325 Id.
326 Waxman, supra note 324.
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 Letter from Henry Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, H. Comm. on Government
Reform, to Tom Davis, Chairman, H. Comm. on Government Reform (Oct. 25, 2005),
available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20051o25100329-39397.pdf.
330 Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Scott Higham, Contractor Accused Of Overbilling U.S;
Technology Company Hired After 9/11 Charged Too Much for Labor, Audit Says, WASH.
POST, Oct. 23, 2005, at Aol, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/1O/22/AR2oo5lo2201437_pf.html.
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"overbilled taxpayers for as much as 171,000 hours' worth of labor and
overtime by charging up to $131 an hour for employees who were paid
less than half that amount."331 In closing, Waxman delivered this
ultimatum. "Unless we radically change our approach toward the
Homeland Security Department, we will not fulfill our constitutional
obligation to conduct oversight and to protect the taxpayer from
waste, fraud, and abuse."332
Others share Congress' concerns. Professor Steven L. Schooner,
the Co-Director of the Government Procurement Program at the
George Washington University Law School, also testified at the
October 2007 hearing. Schooner explained that as the nation's
procurement system "struggled throughout this decade, Congress has
been quick to call for more auditors and inspectors general to
scrutinize contracting." 333 While characterizing this reaction as a
"responsible gesture," Schooner believes it was not enough. 334
Schooner concluded that the Department does not have "meaningful
short-term alternatives for escaping its current predicament ....
Only serious, long term, far reaching personnel reforms can, in any
meaningful manner, begin to reverse the current trend."335
In short, mismanagement and lack of oversight plague the
Department. As a result, the American taxpayers are forced to pay,
literally, for the Department's mismanagement. Reports like these
331 According to the audit, "Unisys billed taxpayers $131.12 an hour for a technical writer
who should have made no more than $46.43. The extra money was generally not passed
along to the employees but was kept by the company." Similarly, Pentagon auditors
concluded that "Unisys and its subcontractors billed the government for 24,982 hours'
worth of overtime that was not permitted under the contract," and that the overtime
charges "appeared to represent '100 percent profit to Unisys.'" Id.
332 Waxman Letter, supra note 329. Recently, Unisys has also been implicated in
misconduct regarding a series of cyber attacks. According to information uncovered by the
House Committee on Homeland Security, Unisys's failure to properly install and monitor
the Department's information technology networks. See Ellen Nakashima & Brian Krebs,
Contractor Blamed in DHS Data Breaches, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2007, at Ao, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/23/AR2oo7092301471.html.
333 Is DHS Too Dependent on Contractors to Do the Government's Work?: Hearing Before
the S. Subcomm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 1ioth Cong. (2007)
(statement of Steve L. Schooner, Co-Director, Government Procurement Law Program),
available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/11707Schooner.pdf.
334 Id.
335 Id.
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prompted Senator Lieberman to ask, "How can the Department
possibly protect the nation's critical cyber-structure if it cannot keep
its own house in order?"336
VII. CONCLUSION
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace recognized that
"[g]overnment alone cannot sufficiently secure cyberspace,"337 and
that "[n]o single strategy can completely eliminate cyberspace
vulnerabilities and their associated threats." 338 Furthermore, the
National Strategy advised that because "the private sector is best
equipped and structured to respond to an evolving cyber threat," the
"public-private engagement" is an indispensable component of the
nation's strategic efforts to secure cyberspace.339 Similarly, the 2005
Report to the President recognized the need for the right people to be
in the right places at the right time. "Improving the Nation's
cybersecurity posture requires highly trained people to develop,
deploy, and incorporate new cybersecurity products and practices."340
336 Press Release, Senator Joseph Lieberman, DHS Is Failing in Its Cyber-Security
Responsibilities (July 11, 2005), available at
http://ieberman.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=24o394.
337 THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE 2 (2003),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National-Cyberspace-Strategy.pdf. See also Corey
McKenna, Chertoff Calls for Public-Private Cooperation on Cybersecurity, GOV'T
EXECUTIVE, Aug. 2, 2005, http://www.govtech.com/gt/96147.topic=117671 (quoting
Secretary Chertoff, "Security, even cyber security, cannot take the form of government
dictates, but must be the product of strong partnership work and disciplined
collaboration.").
338 THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE, supra note 337, at 10.
339 Id.
340 See PRESIDENT'S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, CYBER SECURITY: A
CRISIS OF PRIORITIZATION 3 (2005) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
ADVISORY COMMITTEE], available at
http://www.nitrd.gov/pitac/reports/2oo5o3o cybersecurity/cybersecurity.pdf. One
industry insider commented:
One important objective of any sharing activities, therefore, should be to shorten
the time it takes for the defenders to respond to new attacks. That requires not
only strong computer security technical skills but also sharing of knowledge
among the "good guys and gals" that is at least as effective as the sharing that
goes on among those who would do us harm.
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Given the magnitude of this task, the number of qualified individuals
involved in the Department's efforts is far too small.341 The report
concluded:
The Federal government should intensify its efforts to
promote recruitment and retention of cyber security
researchers and students at research universities, with
a goal of at least doubling the size of the civilian cyber
security fundamental research community by the end
of the decade. In particular, the Federal government
should increase and stabilize the funding for
fundamental research in civilian cyber security, and
should support programs that enable researchers to
move into cyber security research from other fields.342
But, the Department has not accomplished these goals. Despite well-
meaning intentions, there "continues to be a lack of leadership, hard
work and execution when it comes to securing the information
infrastructure."343
Even if the Department finds (and retains) these qualified
individuals, will it be enough? Will the Department allow individuals
to do what is necessary in the face of a catastrophe? The protection of
this Nation's cyber infrastructure is critical for its survival. Yes, the
obstacles are intimidating, but, the "American people are tired of
hearing that getting a 'D' is a security improvement."344 The nation's
enemies "use[] the Internet to great effect to share information. We
need to be at least as effective."345 As the GAO reports seem to
See Securing Our Infrastructure: Private/Public Information Sharing: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Alan Paller,
Director of Research, The SANS Institute) [hereinafter Securing Our Infrastructure],
available at http://www.senate.gov/-govt-aff/050802paller.pdf.
341 PRESIDENT'S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMM=ITEE, supra note 340, at 3.
342 Id.
343 "We are not seeking to condemn the government or those currently involved in
cybersecurity."
344 Hacking the Homeland: Investigating Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities at the
Department of Homeland Security: Hearing Before the H. Comm. of Homeland Security,
1ioth Cong. (2007) (Statement of Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman), available at
http://hsc.house.gov/SiteDocuments/2007o620144350-15564.pdf.
345 Securing Our Infrastructure, supra note 340.
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indicate that the "[r]estructuing the federal bureaucracy [was] the
wrong approach [because] [t]he creation of the massive Department
of Homeland Security has produced no efficiencies or synergy and
arguably has weakened each of the component parts."346
Attacks on the nation's cybersecurity are constant and virulent.
The federal government has tapped the Department to patrol and
protect the Nation's cyber infrastructure. But, as explained in detail,
waste, inefficiency, and mismanagement plague the Department and
stymie the federal government's legitimate attempts to provide
security. This ineffectiveness leads to the question- who, or what,
deserves the blame? The answer to that question is not easily
answered, and this article addresses only a few of the many issues that
factor into the cyber equation. Therefore, any solution for redressing
the Department's inadequacies must streamline the mechanism by
which the Department identifies and addresses cyber threats.
Napoleon Bonaparte once said, "Take time to deliberate, but when
the time for action has arrived, stop thinking and go in." The security
of the Nation's cyber infrastructure is tenuous, and to echo the
industry's battle cry: "the time for action is now. We have moved
beyond the discussion and planning phase and have identified
concrete actions that can be taken by the administration to
immediately improve the security of our nation's cyber systems."347
When it comes to securing the Nation's cyber infrastructure, the
words of the Jedi Master Yoda resonate: "Do, or do not. There is no
try. "348
346 Brittany L. Dorn, Does Nation Need New Super-Agency?, HARTFORD COURANT,
July 20, 2007, at B5, available at http://www.topix.net/content/trb/2oo7/o7/does-
nation-need-new-super-agency.
347 Corey McKenna, Industry Group Calls on Federal Government to Strengthen Cyber
Security, GOV'T TECH., Dec. 13, 2004, http://www.govtech.Com/gt/92458?topic=117688.
348 THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK ( 2 0th Century Fox 1980).
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